Independents in Parliament
Temporary Status or Final Destination
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12010656 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Raimondas Ibenskas (0000-0003-4128-9464, University of Bergen Bergen Norway), Paulina Sałek‐Lipcean (0009-0004-4408-7707, University of Bergen Bergen Norway), Sona N Golder (0000-0003-2259-2943, Pennsylvania State University University Park Pennsylvania USA), Allan Sikk (0000-0002-7829-6476, University College London London UK) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 50 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Publication date | 2025-05-22 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Legislative Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0362-9805 • E-ISSN: 1939-9162 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/lsq.70015 |
| OpenAlex | W4410602492 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 51 |
Political parties are essential for structuring parliamentary decision‐making in democracies. However, in some countries, as many as 10% of legislators experience spells outside of parliamentary party groups. This paper sheds light on this important group of independent politicians by analyzing whether and when they join existing or new party groups. We argue that the electoral motivations of members of parliament (MPs) affect their incentives for reaffiliation. We capture electoral motivations with two factors: the personal vote of legislators and membership in minor parties that do not have their own parliamentary groups. We test this argument using a novel dataset covering over 800 spells of independence and 500 entries into party groups in three Central and Eastern European countries (Lithuania, Poland, and Romania) since the early 2000s. We find that independents affiliated with a minor party are more likely to form a new party group, while MPs with a significant personal vote or those not affiliated with a minor party are more prone to join an existing party group
Economics · Parliament · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · European Union Policy and Governance · Law · Political Systems and Governance
Technocratic Ministers and Political Leadership in European Democracies
The Personal Vote
Defecting alone or splitting together? Individual and collective party switching by legislators
Patterns of political instability
Inter-Party Mobility among Parliamentary Candidates in Post-Communist East Central Europe
Power versus Ideology
Party group collapse and strategic switching in the European Parliament
Party Policy and Group Affiliation in the European Parliament
Political Entrepreneurs
Winning Alone
Electoral competition after party splits
Changing patterns of party unity in the Knesset
Breakups hurt
Two routes to personalized politics
Perfect timing
Trajectories of the personal vote under open-list proportional representation
Anti-defection rules and party switching in the Italian Parliament
Balancing Costs of Legislative Party Switching in the Danish Parliament 1953–2015
Searching for the Electoral Connection
Electoral Rules and Party Switching
A Cross‐National Analysis of Party Switching
Strategic Ticket Splitting and the Personal Vote in Mixed-Member Electoral Systems
Why are there Independents in Ireland
How do parties react to defections? Electoral strategies after a valence loss
The legislative cost of ruling
Three roads to institutionalisation
Explaining legislative party discipline in a new democracy
The Evolution of Party Systems between Elections
Dealing in Discipline
Analyzing Roll Calls with Perfect Spatial Voting
Parties for Rent? Ambition, Ideology, and Party Switching in Brazil's Chamber of Deputies
Cabinet Survival and Competing Risks
Duration Models and Proportional Hazards in Political Science
Competing Principals, Political Institutions, and Party Unity in Legislative Voting
Looking for Locals
Electoral System Incentives for a Party-Serving Personal Vote
Incentives to cultivate a personal vote
Party system dynamics and the making and breaking of Italian governments
The Hunt for Party Discipline in Congress
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |