Dyadic processes of disclosure and reciprocity in bargaining with communication

Bibliographic Data

ID12166252
AuthorsKathleen L Mcginn (Harvard University, corresponding author), Leigh Thompson (0000-0001-6593-550X, Northwestern University), Max H Bazerman (0000-0002-7009-3340, Harvard University)
Year2002
Volume16
Issue1
Pages17-34
Publication date2002-10-15
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Behavioral Decision Making (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0894-3257 • E-ISSN: 1099-0771
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1002/bdm.430
OpenAlexW2033419513
LanguageEN
Citations received5
References cited32

We offer a study revealing the mechanisms through which communication helps actual bargaining behavior outperform economic predictions. The possibility of individually strategic behavior in the presence of private information leads to game‐theoretic predictions of less than full efficiency. We present a one‐stage, simultaneous offers bargaining game in which buyers and sellers have independent, privately held valuations for the item being sold (i.e. a bilateral auction with two‐sided private information). In three communication treatments, parties are: (a) allowed face‐to‐face communication prior to submitting offers; (b) allowed written communication prior to submitting offers; or (c) allowed no‐communication prior to submitting offers. When parties are allowed pre‐play communication, we find nearly full efficiency (98%). We examine two systematically predictable aspects of dyadic interaction—disclosure and reciprocity—to explain how negotiators achieve this efficiency. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd

Business · Cheap talk · Computer security · Economics · Face (sociological concept · Microeconomics · Private information retrieval · Reciprocity (cultural anthropology · Sociology · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Psychology · Social Psychology

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