Straining towards trust
Some constraints essay on studying trust in organizations
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12167641 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Mark Fichman (0000-0001-9265-1879, Carnegie Mellon University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2003 |
| Volume | 24 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 133-157 |
| Publication date | 2003-02-19 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Organizational Behavior (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0894-3796 • E-ISSN: 1099-1379 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1002/job.189 |
| OpenAlex | W2053490500 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 67 |
Trust is of great interest in organizational research and the social sciences. It is argued here that any theory of trust ought to treat a set of observed empirical regularities as constraints. A constraint on a theory is either an assumption made in constructing the theory (e.g., we assume people have a tendency to be fair in their dealings with others) or an explanandum (e.g., we must explain the tendency people have to be fair in their dealings with others) for which the theory must account. These constraints are best thought of in an evolutionary framework, with intellectual links to game theory, evolutionary biology and evolutionary psychology. In particular, (1) people are disposed towards fairness and reciprocity, they have (2) cognitive modules and (3) emotional dispositions which safeguard them against cheating and trust violation. Given these three constraints, any theory should consider the (4) evidence for cultural constraints on trust, trusting behavior and decisions. These constraints together point us towards an integrated ecology of trust where culture, individual dispositions and cognition jointly influence observed trusting behavior. Some work, particularly Gintis et al. (2002) on altruism, strong reciprocity and cooperation, suggests such an approach to studying trust. The purpose of this essay is to identify this work, organize it, and argue for its bearing on the study of trust and organizations. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd
Altruism (biology · Cheating · Cognition · Constraint (computer-aided design · Economics · Epistemology · Evolutionary psychology · Evolutionary theory · Positive economics · Reciprocity (cultural anthropology · Set (abstract data type · Sociology · Computer Science · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology
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Non-Contractual Relations in Business
Markets and Hierarchies : analysis and antitrust implications
Barriers to the Advance of Organizational Science
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Deciding Advantageously Before Knowing the Advantageous Strategy
Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device
Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments
A rational analysis of the selection task as optimal data selection.
In Search of Homo Economicus
Raising the Stakes in the Ultimatum Game
The Organizational Trust Inventory (OTI)
On the Folly of Rewarding A, While Hoping for B.
Corporate culture and economic theory
The genetical evolution of social behaviour. I
Not So Different After All
Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History
The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism
An Integrative Model of Organizational Trust
Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange
Swift Trust and Temporary Groups
Making It Count
The logic of social exchange
Cultural Transmission and Evolution
The Handicap Principle
Cultural transmission and evolution
Domain-specific reasoning
Can We Trust Social Capital
Making Democracy Work
Evolutionary Social Theory
Passions within Reason
Trust and Growth
The Economic Institutions of Capitalism
Solving the Puzzle of Prosociality
Bowling Alone
Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation
Explaining altruistic behavior in humans
Trust and Distrust in Organizations
The elusive thematic-materials effect in Wason's selection task
Non-Contractual Relations in Business
Does Studying Economics Inhibit Cooperation
The Norm of Reciprocity
Logic and human reasoning
Do Economists Make Bad Citizens
The Evolutionary Stability of Cooperation
| Citations per year | 0.2 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2006 - 2018 (13) |
| Highly cited | No |