Infinite Utility and Temporal Neutrality
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12228289 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Peter Vallentyne (Virginia Commonwealth University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1994 |
| Volume | 6 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 193-199 |
| Publication date | 1994-11-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Utilitas (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0953-8208 • E-ISSN: 1741-6183 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0953820800001576 |
| OpenAlex | W1998488733 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 9 |
Suppose that time is infinitely long towards the future, and that each feasible action produces a finite amount of utility at each time. Then, under appropriate conditions, each action produces an infinite amount of utility. Does this mean that utilitarianism lacks the resources to discriminate among such actions? Since each action produces the same infinite amount of utility, it seems that utilitarianism must judge all actions permissible, judge all actions impermissible, or remain completely silent. If the future is infinite, that is, the prospects for utilitarianism look bleak
Action (physics · Economics · Expected utility hypothesis · Law and economics · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Neutrality · Physics · Political science · Utilitarianism · Economic Theory and Institutions · Law
| Citations per year | 0.11 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 1999 - 2024 (26) |
| Highly cited | No |