Normative Resilience
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12228824 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Henrik Andersson (0000-0003-4191-8347, Lund University, corresponding author), Jakob Green Werkmäster (0000-0001-7210-6857, Lund University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 34 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 195-208 |
| Publication date | 2022-02-08 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Utilitas (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0953-8208 • E-ISSN: 1741-6183 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0953820821000418 |
| OpenAlex | W4210828367 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 16 |
This article discusses the phenomenon of normative resilience, with a focus on evaluative resilience. An object can become more or less valuable. In addition to this change in an object's value, the object's value can become more or less resilient. If it is less resilient, it cannot withstand as much evaluative change without its degree of value changing, as compared to an object with more resilient value. The article consists of three parts. First, examples of resilience are presented to give the reader an intuitive understanding of the phenomenon, Second, the Fitting Attitudes Analysis of value is invoked to provide a formal account of evaluative resilience. Third, the theoretical and practical advantages of acknowledging the existence of evaluative resilience are brought to light
Epistemology · Normative · Object (grammar · Phenomenon · Physics · Psychological resilience · Resilience (materials science · Sociology · Value (mathematics · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology · Artificial Intelligence
The Strike of the Demon
Safety-Based Epistemology
The Domain of Reasons
Beyond Wrong Reasons
How Valuable Is It
Indeterminacy and the Small-Improvement Argument
Knowledge, justification, and (a sort of) safe belief
Parity, Clumpiness and Rational Choice
Personal Value
Value Relations
The Wrong Kind of Reason
Equality, Clumpiness and Incomparability
The Normative and the Evaluative
Reasons as defaults
The right and the wrong kind of reasons
| Citations per year | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2025 - 2026 (2) |
| Highly cited | No |