The British Army and the Origins of its Minimum Force Philosophy
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12258166 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Rod Thornton (0000-0002-9566-8956, King's College London, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2004 |
| Volume | 15 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 83-106 |
| Publication date | 2004-03-21 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Small Wars and Insurgencies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0959-2318 • E-ISSN: 1743-9558 |
| Publisher | Routledge (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/09592310410001677005 |
| OpenAlex | W2041398660 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 42 |
This article considers why the British Army of today holds to the conviction that its peace support operations be conducted with an emphasis on the concept of minimum force. Evidence is presented here to show that the origins of this concept lie in two particular historical determinants: first, the moral parameters set by a religious sentiment refined through interaction with Victorian sensibilities; and, second, the pragmatic necessities of imperial policing. This article goes on to indicate how both these factors shaped – and, most significantly, why they continue to shape – a particularly British approach to the question of low-intensity conflict and, in particular, to the question of the use of military technology in such conflict
Conviction · Epistemology · Political science · Set (abstract data type · Sociology · Computer Science · Law · Military History and Strategy · Philosophy · Politics and Conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Middle East · War, Ethics, and Justification
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Exploring the utility of armed force in peace operations
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A ‘Model Campaign’ Reappraised
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Attempting to deal with the past
Havoc the laws of regular warfare do not sanction
Introduction
British counter-insurgency
Operation Motorman (1972) and the search for a coherent British counterinsurgency strategy in Northern Ireland
The revisionist historiography of Britain's decolonisation conflicts and political science theses of civilian victimisation in counterinsurgency
Footprints in the Sand
| Unique citing works | 42 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,1 |
| Citation span | 2006 - 2026 (21) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 37 |