Procedural breakdown and deadlock in the Russian State Duma
The problems of an unlinked dual‐channel institutional design
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12299358 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Joel M Ostrow (0000-0003-3564-0238, University of California, Berkeley, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1998 |
| Volume | 50 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 793-816 |
| Publication date | 1998-07-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Europe Asia Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0966-8136 • E-ISSN: 1465-3427 |
| Publisher | Routledge (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/09668139808412566 |
| OpenAlex | W2033807934 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 8 |
| References cited | 7 |
ONLY THREE MONTHS after T-72 tanks bombed the Russian Supreme Soviet into the past, the Russian electorate adopted a new Constitution and elected a new legislature in December 1993.1 In spite of all the change, though, it may appear that little has changed for Russia's legislature. The new State Duma shares many of its unfortunate predecessor's characteristics: its large membership is dispersed among roughly two dozen committees, ambiguity persists in its triangular relations with government and president, and its leadership body is even called a 'soviet'.2 One significant change, however, has held dramatic consequences for Russian legislative processes. The Supreme Soviet excluded partisan factions from its institutional design but, like most legislatures, the Duma has a dual-channel design with both committees and partisan factions.3 In spite of the weakness, instability and lack of societal roots of Russia's post-communist partisan organisations, the Duma's creators essentially grafted a faction-based structure onto the Supreme Soviet's non-partisan, committee-centred design. With most other environmental and institutional variables remaining constant, this affords an unusual opportunity to examine the effects of institutional design on legislative behaviour. What are the implications of increasing party strength in legislatures in states with high levels of political fragmentation? The Duma's experience vividly demonstrates that including partisan organisations does not solve a legislature's problem of managing conflict. How they are integrated relative to legislative committees determines the combination of incentives and constraints that will either compel legislators to pursue conflict-management strategies or leave them unconstrained in the exercise of individual discretion even if this means confrontation and deadlock. The Duma has an unlinked, dual-channel design, in which partisan factions and legislative committees are parallel, autonomous channels of organisation. The lack of links between the channels leaves deputies unconstrained to pursue strategies of competition, conflict and sabotage in the Duma's internal, legislative process. It renders the Russian legislature unable to manage internal conflict on legislative issues. Committees fight each other, effectively blocking each others' initiatives. Factions
Channel (broadcasting · Deadlock · Dual (grammatical number · Linguistics · Political science · Programming language · State (computer science · Telecommunications · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Philosophy · Political Conflict and Governance · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
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| Citations per year | 0.3 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 1999 - 2013 (15) |
| Highly cited | No |