Institutional design and legislative conflict
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6180760 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Joel M Ostrow (0000-0003-3564-0238, University of California, Berkeley, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1996 |
| Volume | 29 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 413-433 |
| Publication date | 1996-12-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Communist and Post-Communist Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0967-067X • E-ISSN: 1873-6920 |
| Publisher | University of California Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1016/s0967-067x(96)80024-9 |
| OpenAlex | W2030525260 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
| References cited | 6 |
This article develops a comparative institutional framework for evaluating the new legislatures of the former Soviet Union, and demonstrates that the conventional wisdom about the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet is wrong. It was not a totalitarian, Soviet institution whose omnipotent and malevolent Chair singlehandedly dominated policy outputs and controlled the membership. Rather, the Supreme Soviet's non-partisan, committee-centered design enabled the committees to dominate the legislative process and to virtually exclude conflict, even on such objectively contentious legislative issues as the annual budget. However, the non-partisan design denied the legislature the mechanisms for controlling the Chair on non-legislative, political issues, particularly in relations with the executive branch. On legislative issues, the Supreme Soviet was a well-oiled machine, but on political issues it was out of control, thus leading to the legislature's demise. This article demonstrates the utility of an institutional framework for comparing post-communist legislatures, and the necessity of disaggregating legislative and political issues when evaluating legislative performance
Communism · Demise · Institution · Legislature · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Supreme court · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Public Administration
| Citations per year | 0.18 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 1998 - 2013 (16) |
| Highly cited | No |