Sub‐Saharan Africa

Africa has experienced an unprecedented level of involvement in its regional affairs by Middle Eastern states in the past few years.11 In the following I focus on sub-Saharan Africa, which is here understood as the community of all African states minus Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia. These North African Arab states share a long history with the Middle East and can indeed be considered as core members of the Middle Eastern regional system. For the sake of readability, the adjective “sub-Saharan” is usually omitted. This is a remarkable development, indeed, given that transregional relations have been characterized by reciprocal ignorance for most of the post-World War II period. The scope of these current transregional entanglements can be best observed along the African coast bordering the Red Sea. Middle Eastern states have facilitated peace talks in, for instance, Sudan (Qatar, 2008–2011), and Somalia (Saudi Arabia, 2007; Turkey, since 2011), as well as between Djibouti and Eritrea (Qatar, 2010–2017).22 Mehran Kamrava, “Mediation and Qatari Foreign Policy,” Middle East Journal 65, no. 4 (2011): 539–556; idem, “Mediation and Saudi Foreign Policy,” Orbis 57, no. 1 (2013): 152–170; International Crisis Group, Assessing Turkey's Role in Somalia (Nairobi/Istanbul/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2012), Africa Briefing 92. More recently, concerted mediation efforts by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia have led to an agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia — ending, finally, their 20-year war in September 2018 — and stimulated fresh negotiations between Djibouti and Eritrea. New talks have also been facilitated regarding the three-way conflict among Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan over sharing the Nile waters.33 Amr Emam, “Optimism in Egypt over Nile Dam Talks Breakthrough,” The Arab Weekly, May 27, 2018, 10, https://thearabweekly.com/optimism-egypt-over-nile-dam-talks-breakthrough. However, recent Middle Eastern spats have also left the Horn of Africa facing security-related repercussions. The intra-Gulf crisis pitting Saudi Arabia and the UAE against Qatar and Turkey has reverberated to such an extent that the African Union discussed the spillover in January 2018.44 Patrick Smith, “African Union: Summiteers in Addis Try to Manage a Military Scramble in the Horn and the Sahel amid Fresh Reform Efforts,” Africa Confidential, January 29, 2018, https://www.africa-confidential.com/blog-entry/AFRICAN+UNION%3A+Summiteers+in+Addis+try+to+manage+a+military+scramble+in+the+Horn+and+the+Sahel+amid+fresh+reform+efforts. And while the recent diplomatic breakthrough between Eritrea and Ethiopia has been widely praised as an important step toward regional stabilization, observers also caution that Middle Eastern geopolitical rivalries could “provoke destabilizing reactions across the Horn of Africa.”55 Camille Lons, “Saudi Arabia and the UAE Look to Africa,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 23, 2018, https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/77561. This is even more true as the Red Sea has experienced notable militarization of late.66 Shehab al-Makahleh and Giorgio Cafiero, “The Militarization of the Red Sea,” LobeLog, January 10, 2018, https://lobelog.com/the-militarization-of-the-red-sea/. Besides the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which have already established military bases in the region or are planning to do so, Middle Eastern states are also emerging as regional military players. Egypt, Iran, Israel and Qatar obviously have a stake in these developments, while Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the UAE, which seem bent on becoming key actors in the Greater Horn, are constructing a series of military bases from Sudan to Somalia. The debates about the militarization of the Red Sea obscure, however, the fact that Africa as a whole has become a region of vital interest to these and other Middle Eastern states, each of them with its own history of relations there. While prospective economic benefits and international prestige have long dominated the agenda, present-day dynamics are heavily driven by the struggle for hegemony in the Middle East. This article focuses on the policies of Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, the dominant regional powers at the center of the hegemonic competition.77 See also Jens Heibach, “Yet Another Scramble: Why Middle Eastern Powers Are Reaching Out to Africa,” GIGA Focus: Middle East, no. 5 (November 2018), https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publication/yet-another-scramble-why-middle-eastern-powers-are-reaching-out-to-africa. On the one hand, their turn to Africa indicates that their foreign policies have become more assertive on the international stage, especially regarding South-South relations. On the other, their current strategic approaches and their politics of alliance building follow very closely the logic of conflict dynamics in their home region. Although Ankara, Riyadh and Tehran stress the historic and cultural depth of their centuries-old relations with Africa, the forging of diplomatic ties with postcolonial African states is a relatively new phenomenon. Iran first reached out to the continent's decolonizing states in the 1950s. Under Pahlavi rule, its Africa policy mainly sought to contain communism by supporting the economies of “moderate” states such as Ethiopia, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan and Zaire. By 1976, on the eve of the Islamic Revolution, it had established bilateral relations with 31 African states.88 Alhadji Bouba Nouhou, “L'Iran et l'Afrique: Une coopération à l'épreuve des faits,” Confluences Méditerranée 90, no. 3 (2014): 141–151, 142. The emergence of the Islamic Republic altered the approach to these states, increasing their importance to Tehran in many ways. After the revolution in 1979, Iran was diplomatically isolated across large parts of the globe, including the Middle East.99 Alex Vatanka, “Iran Abroad,” in Authoritarianism Goes Global: The Challenge to Democracy, eds. Larry Diamond, Christopher Walker and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 2016), 67–77, 70. Africa provided an opportunity to politically and economically break this isolation. With international sanctions imposed on Tehran, the continent gained in importance as a market for exports, particularly crude oil, and provided access to raw materials. Poverty in large parts of the African continent, in turn, opened the door to Iranian influence in many states — especially in the Sahel — despite Tehran's limited means.1010 Javad Heiran-Nia and Somayeh Khomarbaghi, “Saudi Arabia and Iran Compete in the Sahel,” LobeLog, February 8, 2018, https://lobelog.com/saudi-arabia-and-iran-compete-in-the-sahel/. Besides direct military and financial aid, development assistance distributed via Construction Jihad (Jahad-e Sazandegi), an organization created in the wake of the revolution and later merged with the Ministry of Agriculture, was a major tool for gaining a foothold.1111 Eric Lob, “The Islamic Republic of Iran's Foreign Policy and Construction Jihad's Developmental Activities in Sub-Saharan Africa,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 48, no. 2 (2016): 313–338. Another was missionary activities, often conducted via Iranian-financed cultural centers or schools, both in countries with significant Shiite minorities such as Ghana and Nigeria, as well as those with Sunni majorities like Mali or Senegal.1212 Wagdy Sawahel, “Iran's ‘Branch Campuses’ Reach Sub-Saharan Africa,” University World News, September 28, 2018, https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20180925134208657; Paul Raymond and Jack Watling, “The Iranian-Saudi Proxy Wars Come to Mali,” Foreign Policy, August 19, 2015, https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/19/the-iran-saudi-proxy-wars-come-to-mali-shiite-sunni-islam/. Altogether, the Islamic Republic's involvement in Africa has fluctuated in scope and intensity over time, depending on the international pressure on Tehran as well as the foreign-policy orientation of its leadership.1313 Eric Lob, “The Islamic Republic of Iran's Foreign Policy and Construction Jihad's Developmental Activities in Sub-Saharan Africa,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 48, no. 2 (2016): 313–338. It was strongest under President Ahmadinejad (2005–13), when, due to the conflict over its nuclear program, Tehran was in need of international partners. It sought them in the Côte d'Ivoire, Lesotho, Mauritania, Namibia and South Africa — a nonpermanent member of the United Nations Security Council from 2007 to 2008.1414 Alex Vatanka, “Iran's Awkward Diplomacy in Africa,” The National Interest, March 23, 2016, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/irans-awkward-diplomacy-africa-15571; Ahmad Majidyar, “Iran's FM Zarif Tours South America and Africa to Boost Ties,” Middle East Institute, April 13, 2018, https://www.mei.edu/publications/irans-fm-zarif-tours-south-america-and-africa-boost-ties. States with notable uranium deposits, like Malawi, Niger, Sierra Leone, Togo and Uganda, became focal points under Ahmadinejad's tenure1515 Hamdy A. Hassan and Hala Thabet, “Africa and the Middle East: Shifting Alliances and Strategic Partnerships,” in Africa and the World: Bilateral and Multilateral International Diplomacy, eds. Dawn Nagar and Charles Mutasa (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 335–357, 347. — as did “rogue states” such as Eritrea and Sudan, mostly for reasons of their geostrategic location.1616 Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, “Iran in the Horn of Africa: Outflanking U.S. Allies,” Middle East Policy 19, no. 2 (2012), 117–133; Gerald Feierstein and Craig Greathead, The Fight for Africa: The New Focus of the Saudi-Iranian Rivalry (Washington, DC: Middle East Institute, 2017), Policy Focus 2, 1–2. During President Rouhani's first term (2013–17), Iran's engagement in Africa abated. With the international nuclear deal in the offing, the continent's political and economic importance to Iran decreased considerably. Iranian trade figures can be seen as a clear indication of this. Paradoxically, this is about the same time that Saudi Arabia began to rediscover its strategic interest in Africa after a prolonged period of neglect. The beginnings of Saudi Arabia's Africa policy date back to King Faisal (1964–75), who is credited with having established the bulk of the country's diplomatic relations with African states after the Six-Day War of 1967 in an effort to isolate Israel. Faysal is thus deemed responsible for the first coherent policy toward the continent, one that was abandoned, however, soon after his death.1717 ʿAbdallah Ibrahim al-Tarifi, under King Faysal This is to that Riyadh was from the continent The has sought to its vital in its the Horn of Africa — especially Somalia. In the it the United States in the Union the War later to about between in the new The Horn of Africa: and International New and “Saudi Arabia and the Horn of Africa,” in Saudi Foreign and New 2016), from for crude and was African states on the Saudi “Saudi Arabia's for Middle East Policy no. 1 92. for on the market in the — via the — the King for Saudi to Saudi to in foreign By Saudi had already Ethiopia, Niger, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, and of the of and for Saudi the of the King for Saudi the to as best Turkey's policy toward the continent is in Saudi Arabia its strategic interest in Africa in the wake of the Arab in for of Iranian the this time, Saudi in Africa had Riyadh of the by Iranian cultural centers and their own political Paul Raymond and Jack Watling, “The Iranian-Saudi Proxy Wars Come to Mali,” Foreign Policy, August 19, 2015, https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/19/the-iran-saudi-proxy-wars-come-to-mali-shiite-sunni-islam/. it for Riyadh to to back its new strategic in a by the for African States at the Saudi Ministry of Foreign that Saudi in Africa to Iranian toward The by the for African States at the Saudi Ministry of Foreign is by In Saudi Arabia's new focus on Africa became in It thus with the to of the and of the and with the of the war in The military against the in the to be Iranian altered the geostrategic importance of the Horn of Africa in the of and “The States and the Horn of Africa: New Middle East Policy no. 4 — and of and in this Although the UAE has become one of the most on the African continent in its own for instance, International Crisis Group, The United Arab Emirates in the Horn of Africa International Crisis Group, 2018), Crisis Middle East Briefing with major economic it that has been closely its policies with Besides the recent concerted mediation in Horn of Africa states, is best in their efforts to — and — military It has been for instance, that military and by Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the coast of the Horn of Africa are considered military all in a Security to in the Red Sea and the Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies no. 4 the military in a recent by the International Crisis that a agreement to to out the International Crisis Group, The United Arab In October 2018, Riyadh with Hassan to in by military World in with Djibouti and The October 2018, no. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are their own in Africa, it is to that conflict dynamics in the Middle East — and the war in in — have facilitated the building of especially on the Red African In the past Riyadh and have effort in Iran's relations with Sudan, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Somalia. These efforts had been at as most of the states their ties with Tehran, it more for instance, for Iranian to the Red Rivalry in Africa: for Middle East Policy no. 4 the UAE military bases in Eritrea and while Saudi Arabia is about to its first one in John and for Saudi Military January for Military in the Horn of Africa no. the conflict in the Red Sea are and The recent diplomatic between Riyadh and on the one hand, and Sudan and Somalia on the other, have opened for their Middle Eastern to influence in the Horn, including The Scramble for Africa: Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: for Strategic and International 2018), for Military Turkey has been to its in the to the Middle East for the past and the of Turkey in the Shifting International World no. (2016): While its interest in Africa can be back to the of relations with African states with the to of — who in his country's to and as a in Africa: of in Journal of Eastern African Studies no. 2 a on Riyadh and Tehran — in fact the of its and in with Africa,” February 10, 2018, The figures are The of in Africa, for instance, from in to in bilateral trade with African countries reached in a since are to have by The also the in its development assistance to African countries and the fact that who has African states is who Africa the most in the of Africa to New February 2018, the to as best Turkey's policy toward the continent is in Africa policy in the new has been mainly by the of economic and political in international and a While International Journal no. 1 (2013): strategic seem to have become even more in the few economic a of its to Africa it is the for In to sub-Saharan states have been on North While to In the past has the Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Somalia and Sudan, and Algeria, Mauritania, Senegal, South Africa and and thus have to the in Africa, and and to in March 2018, also to political relations with new after Turkey's out with the Union and the of Middle Eastern to Africa and Turkey's New March In the of diplomatic relations with sub-Saharan African countries — home to of the And thus the Middle East and North Africa, with in However, by sub-Saharan Africa is to have a share of the the Middle East and North Africa The of World (Washington, DC: — is also to to Islamic for instance, for the Islamic Foreign January 10, that is heavily by thus have a of reasons for past of Saudi and engagement with — or from — Besides which has been conducted by Riyadh and Tehran and to have been a an since the to of the has become a key of foreign policy — including with to Africa — as a to to Islamic most via the or other Islamic with ties to the has been an tool for gaining influence among African in, for instance, Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia. See for the Islamic Foreign January 10, African states have often been seen as a for international economic have dominated the Iranian and as well as that of Saudi Arabia, to sub-Saharan states by those of Iran and in of their figures for sub-Saharan states as a of it is to economic reasons can the This especially true for Saudi Arabia, as its is with those of many African states, own are also on — and “The and the in Sub-Saharan Africa: the in The Arab States of the and New Strategic in and 2016), the Saudi of and the importance of economic with Africa to the of Saudi economic the of between Saudi Arabia and Africa 19, it clear in the Saudi that hegemonic in the Middle East are the of its current foreign policy It is mainly bent on its regional as well as the continent's to its to in the Middle East. in turn, strategic reactions by and a Africa is becoming a of Middle Eastern of international relations have long the of for have often been seen as for are few approaches for the of including in a given region. to one actors their in a region in with their both and in their home region. a region — or — in importance to actors depending on its and on Journal of Strategic Studies no. 1 The Africa policy of Saudi Arabia this logic in ways. Africa as a region with due to its importance to Africa on the Saudi after Riyadh had the continent's strategic for and The the Saudi to the African for and Strategic In for instance, a Saudi turn to Africa, that a of the with other states the to Africa — which a geopolitical to Foreign Policy in Africa 29, Africa the for African Ahmad are on the — the more as have to the African continent in past as was an opportunity to of which have the of and in Africa September more Riyadh Africa as a region of to its vital For a for instance, “Saudi Arabia and Africa: to of the March 29, on the reasons for new which be toward all African states, on the continent's to the Saudi the of and in Africa September are limited in to economic Riyadh for instance, on and in its military in in with has to with regarding the of the for The May 2018, no. African states are to back the Saudi in diplomatic for instance, Crisis to in the Horn of Africa,” 29, to the The World to Sub-Saharan Africa: is the United (Washington, DC: for Strategic and International 2018), to be a of prestige by the of the Islamic Military to Fight or the Arab Islamic to the in May supporting to in the sub-Saharan states are members of while of states the from sub-Saharan Africa In May Foreign Javad Zarif from its economic and political Tehran was also to and in engagement is a of and Iranian in The of a military in Somalia, as well as of in the Red Sea in for instance, be as a to Saudi and On the the of for instance, for also for Military in the Horn of Africa no. These however, are considered to Arab in has been by New Arab in the Red Sea January 13, This is even more the as has to its policies in the Red Sea with under the economic and political by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE and that began with the diplomatic of Iran, has its in Africa Rouhani's term Ahmad Majidyar, to Iran's with Africa,” Middle East Institute, for of with and African Iran January 2018, after his in May Foreign Javad Zarif from its economic and political Tehran was also to and in with Africa Iran's Islamic Republic May This can be as a clear to recent Saudi engagement there. In the of Iranian African states, including has Iran's on Africa has been by the of the nuclear deal by the and Tehran's need to its these developments, strategic to Tehran has become of to The of transregional relations can be seen as a for The 2018 agreement between Ethiopia and by the of from Riyadh and the that Middle Eastern states can in peace — in regional on their as long as it is geopolitical that the of Middle Eastern the for African peace and This has already in a of in On the diplomatic with Qatar to the conflict between and in Qatari out of the after both countries with Eritrea in after Qatar In Somalia, the Middle Eastern regional for influence the of the increasing the of The by the the at the 2018, no. In Nigeria, the Saudi-Iranian conflict has to a of between the and the Islamic and The of the on the in Journal of no. 1 These and other have that Africa is about to become a new for Middle Eastern for instance, Africa,” Africa, January 2016, and the do indeed that gaining influence at each is the for Ankara, Riyadh and Tehran for instance, the to the Council of Arab and African States the Red Sea and the of discussed by of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Somalia, Sudan and in and Riyadh in and 2018, the was in January and as a to among its members and to trade and in the of the Council of Arab and African States the Red Sea and the of January Eritrea the Council as a In 2018, the of the Council was in in in February had about See of Arab and African States of the Red Sea February 13, of Foreign that it was of the efforts to its — to influence on this “Saudi Arabia, Red Sea and of States Reach for Arab News, 13, 2018, Iran and Turkey was understood by in the Arab states, as well in Iran and Turkey See Sea to Iran News, 13, 2018, Sea Saudi to and Iranian in Ankara, Riyadh and Tehran of strategic it is the Middle Eastern in the heavily on African to past Iran's in Africa is limited due to both Tehran's of the continent Rouhani's first term and Saudi and The from the nuclear deal and the between and Tehran have importance to Iran with economic sanctions in its Africa In a the same true for Ankara, which is facing a as a of Turkey's economic While Iran's foreign-policy has become to with limited over the past few it to be seen Turkey's foreign policy to its own financial its alliance with which be to of in one or Turkey's Africa policy can be to this to the of which is from facing in its African affairs and which has a at hand, both in of and strategic For the time and Riyadh have a of strategic in share a toward Iran, Turkey and or this for a and to a Africa policy is of the of foreign-policy Saudi Arabia and the UAE have strategic with to the war in — even more the of that for instance, “The March Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 29, 2018, A. the The UAE in The Arab States in May “Saudi Arabia and Rivalry over The New May 2018, Although the war is to the of a Africa policy in many on the extent to which Riyadh and be to their on the Arab of the This it is also It was the war that to efforts in Africa in the first as of in relations — — new dynamics in the struggle for

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