Economic development and village elections in rural China

Bibliographic Data

ID12422305
AuthorsTianjian Shi (Duke University, corresponding author)
Year1999
Volume8
Issue22
Pages425-442
Publication date1999-11-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Contemporary China (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1067-0564 • E-ISSN: 1469-9400
PublisherRoutledge (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/10670569908724356
OpenAlexW1971749207
LanguageEN
Citations received21
References cited21

Many observers of Chinese politics suggest that there are certain relationships between economic development and village elections. Using empirical data gathered from a 1993 nationwide survey, this study examines whether economic development is associated in any way with successful elections in Chinese villages. The analysis reveals that the relationship between economic development and village elections appears to be a concave curve: economic wealth increases the likelihood that a village will hold semicompetitive elections for people to choose their leaders, but its impact diminishes as economic wealth increases. Rapid economic development may even delay the process of political development because incumbent leaders can use newly acquired economic resources to consolidate their power by: (1) making peasants more dependent on the village authority; (2) providing incumbent leaders with resources to co‐opt peasants; and (3) providing incumbent leaders with resources to bribe their superiors to ignore the decisions of the central government to introduce competitive elections into Chinese villages

China · Development economics · Economic geography · Economic growth · Economics · Geography · Political science · Rural development · Socioeconomics · China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Hong Kong and Taiwan Politics

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