Localism in Retreat? Central-Provincial Relations in the Xi Jinping Era
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12423221 |
|---|---|
| Authors | David J Bulman (0000-0003-3370-3717, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, corresponding author), Kyle A Jaros (0000-0001-8372-6461, University of Notre Dame) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 30 |
| Issue | 131 |
| Pages | 697-716 |
| Publication date | 2021-02-26 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Contemporary China (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1067-0564 • E-ISSN: 1469-9400 |
| Publisher | Routledge (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/10670564.2021.1889228 |
| OpenAlex | W3135096665 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 19 |
Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption drive, personnel reshuffles, and institutional overhauls seem to mark a turning point in Beijing’s long-running fight against ‘localism’ (difangzhuyi). Yet, key questions remain about the scope and effectiveness of efforts to rein in China’s subnational officials. Has the Xi administration effectively combated localism by appointing more outsiders to provincial leadership teams? Or have strengthened oversight institutions made subnational officials more responsive to the center regardless of their individual backgrounds? To address these questions, this article distinguishes between different types of localism in contemporary China and the varying personnel ‘risk factors’ underlying them. Comparing the makeup of provincial party standing committees under Xi Jinping’s 18th CPC Central Committee (2012–2017) with those from the 15–17th CPC Central Committees under Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao (1997–2012), the analysis finds that Xi has accelerated personnel changes to address multiple forms of localism. At the same time, gaps in governance outcomes between local cadres and outsiders have faded since 2012 in several domains, implying that Xi-era institutional reforms have also played a role in curbing localism. Even under Xi, however, important personnel risk factors for localism have persisted and in some domains local-outsider differences in governance outcomes have actually increased
Administration (probate law · Beijing · China · Corporate governance · Economics · Localism · Management · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Sociology · State (computer science · China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance · Chinese history and philosophy · Hong Kong and Taiwan Politics · Law · Public Administration
Picking Losers
The effect of anti-corruption efforts on evaluations of governance
The outsiders
The Shenzhen Exception
China's democratic experiments during its economic takeoff
Provinces in Command
Financing technological innovation in China
New Leader, New Policy? Bureaucratic Turnover and Policy Stability in China
Regional economic integration on China’s Inland periphery
China’s dichotomous BeiDou strategy
China’s new policy initiatives and their implication for sustainable development
How does the Chinese bureaucracy sustain economic growth without stable local political leaders? Stratified spatial mobility and the role of stable political elites in local governments
Economic compensation for elite dismissals in authoritarian regimes
Provincial deficits and political centralization
Governance by Uncertainty
The Anxiety of Embedded Officials
Critical Han Studies Through the Lens of Internal Colonialism
China's Central-Local Relations
Local social governance in China
| Unique citing works | 19 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 3,8 |
| Citation span | 2021 - 2026 (6) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 19 |