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The US Presidency

Power and Constraint

Bibliographic Data

ID12463501
AuthorsCorey Brettschneider (1Department of Political Science, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island, USA; email: [email protected]), Aidan Calvelli, Aidan G Calvelli (0009-0001-4565-7810, 2Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA; email: [email protected])
Year2024
Volume27
Issue1
Pages205-222
Publication date2024-06-12
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueAnnual Review of Political Science (BOOK_SERIES)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1094-2939 • E-ISSN: 1545-1577
PublisherAnnual Reviews (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1146/annurev-polisci-051120-113134
OpenAlexW4399571767
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited15

How much should we fear that a president will break the law to pursue power—then use their office to avoid legal accountability? Political scientists studying the presidency have often overlooked the risk of what we here call a criminal president. Donald Trump's presidency spotlighted that risk and has begun to shift the field's focus toward not just presidential power but presidential constraints. We believe this shift should continue. In this review, we aim to set an agenda that makes the danger of a criminal president central to understanding the presidency more broadly. Situating the criminal presidency within wider questions about legal and constitutional constraints on presidential power, we emphasize the unique risks to democracy that a president unbound by law can pose. We call for a greater focus on the legal rules governing the executive branch—especially unitary executive ideas—and the policies needed to hold criminal presidents accountable

Accountability · Criminal law · Democracy · Law and economics · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Presidency · Presidential system · Separation of powers · Sociology · American Constitutional Law and Politics · Law · Law, Rights, and Freedoms · Legal and Constitutional Studies

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Unique citing works1
Citations per year1
Citation span2026 - 2026 (1)
Citation velocitycurrent
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 1

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