Measuring Fairness, Inequality, and Big Data
Social Choice Since Arrow
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 12463527 |
|---|---|
| Autores | John W Patty (0000-0002-1142-9334, Emory University), Elizabeth Maggie Penn (0000-0002-2018-4367, Emory University) |
| Año | 2019 |
| Volumen | 22 |
| Número | 1 |
| Páginas | 435-460 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2019-02-06 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Annual Review of Political Science (BOOK_SERIES) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 1094-2939 • E-ISSN: 1545-1577 |
| Editorial | Annual Reviews (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1146/annurev-polisci-022018-024704 |
| OpenAlex | W2912949778 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Referencias citadas | 115 |
Kenneth J. Arrow was one of the most important intellectuals of the twentieth century, and his “impossibility theorem” is arguably the starting point of modern, axiomatic social choice theory. In this review, we begin with a brief discussion of Arrow's theorem and subsequent work that extended the result. We then discuss its implications for voting and constitutional systems, including a number of seminal results—both positive and negative—that characterize what such systems can accomplish and why. We then depart from this narrow interpretation of the result to consider more varied institutional design questions such as apportionment and geographical districting. Following this, we address the theorem's implications for measurement of concepts of fundamental interest to political science such as justice and inequality. Finally, we address current work applying social choice concepts and the axiomatic method to data analysis more generally
Apportionment · Arrow · Arrow's impossibility theorem · Axiom · Axiomatic system · Economic Justice · Economics · Epistemology · Impossibility · Inequality · Interpretation (philosophy · Law and economics · Mathematical economics · Neoclassical economics · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Social choice theory · Sociology · Voting · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Mathematics
Networks
Domain Conditions in Social Choice Theory
CHAPTER 19 Judgment Aggregation
Interpersonal Comparisons of Well‐Being
A Pareto-consistent libertarian claim
On cores and indivisibility
Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
Unpacking the Court
Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
Equity and the Informational Basis of Collective Choice
Equilibrium points in n -person games
Graphs and Cooperation in Games
Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions
An axiomatization of Borda's rule
School Choice
Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives
Manipulation of Voting Schemes
A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
Social Choice and Individual Values
Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive Dilemma
Social Choice and Legitimacy
Collective Choice and Social Welfare
Chapter 11 Utilitarianism and the theory of justice
The Logic of Collective Choice
On the measurement of inequality
Gerrymander-proof representative democracies
A Graph-theoretic perspective on centrality
Aggregation, Evaluation, and Social Choice Theory
Is approval voting an ‘unmitigated evil’
Congressional committee assignments
A defense of Arrow’s independence of irrelevant alternatives
Susceptibility to manipulation
On strategy-proofness and single peakedness
Strategy-proofness and single-peakedness
Social Choice and Individual Values
The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal
On the Rationale of Group Decision-making
An axiomatic approach to network complexity
Measurement of Inequality of Incomes
The Measurement of the Inequality of Incomes
Notes on the Observation and Measurement of Political Power
Measurement Theory
May’s theorem in one dimension
The Structure of Heresthetical Power
Qualitative voting
The New Judicial Politics of Legal Doctrine
Network Analysis and Political Science
Axiomatic Social Choice Theory
Manipulation and Single-Peakedness
Single Transferrable Vote
Rank monotonicity in centrality measures
Analyzing Big Data
Paradoxes and representation
Approval Voting
On Economic Inequality
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
|---|---|
| Altamente citado | No |