Defence industrial policy – a sound security strategy or an economic fallacy

Bibliographic Data

ID12699343
AuthorsArne Martin Fevolden (corresponding author), Kari Tvetbråten (Norwegian Defence Research Establishment)
Year2016
Volume16
Issue2
Pages176-192
Publication date2016-04-02
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueDefence Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1470-2436 • E-ISSN: 1743-9698
PublisherTaylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/14702436.2016.1169893
OpenAlexW2334424488
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited11

This article explores whether it makes sense for national governments to employ defence industrial policies – such as offsets and discriminatory procurement practices – to support their domestic defence industries. This question has so far primarily been discussed by economists, who have argued strongly against the use of defence industrial policies. This article maintains that these economists fail to address the often complex motivation behind the introduction of these policies. It illustrates these shortcomings by contrasting their arguments against a case study of Norway, which accounts for the country’s use of defence industrial polices from the early post-Second World War era up until today. The article concludes that, depending on their objectives, defence industrial policies can be seen as either a sound security strategy or an economic fallacy

Defence industry · Economic policy · Economics · Fallacy · Industrial policy · International trade · Law and economics · Management · Political economy · Political science · Procurement · Sound (geography · Defense, Military, and Policy Studies · Global Peace and Security Dynamics · International Development and Aid

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