A Schumpeterian view of the interplay between innovation and concentration in the EU defence industry
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12699697 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Luca Lambertini (0000-0001-6353-4753, Department of Economics, University of Bologna via San Giacomo 3, Bologna, Italy, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 23 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 608-625 |
| Publication date | 2023-10-02 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Defence Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1470-2436 • E-ISSN: 1743-9698 |
| Publisher | Taylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/14702436.2023.2277474 |
| OpenAlex | W4389314286 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 40 |
The relationship between industry structure, aggregate R&D activity, and the pace and quality of the resulting innovation process is currently the subject of a lively debate across NATO in general and even more so among its European members. This paper tackles this issue from a standpoint belonging to the tradition of industrial economics, adapting it to the specific context of the defence sector. This is done with a view to stressing the need of increasing the degree of concentration in order to increase standardization and interoperability of defence systems and facilitate the exploitation of scale economies. In the traditional jargon of industrial organization theory, this amounts to vindicating the Schumpeterian view according to which increasing concentration (eventually all the way up to pure monopoly) monotonically fosters innovation incentives, while mitigating effort duplications affecting large and longlasting R&D projects. One additional implication, equally relevant, is that the concentration process can indeed be facilitated, in the short to medium term, by systematically resorting to the creation of research joint ventures and/or R&D cartels so as to boost spillover effects and reduce excess investments
Context (archaeology · Economics · Incentive · Industrial organization · Macroeconomics · Market economy · Monopoly · Political science · Spillover effect · Defense, Military, and Policy Studies · Economic Growth and Productivity · Technology Assessment and Management
Advanced industrial economics
The theory of industrial organization
Market structure and innovation
Producing Security
Competition and Innovation
Equilibrium points in n -person games
Cooperation between rivals
Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention
The Role of Marketization in the Europeanization of Defense Industry Policy
Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy
Cooperation and conflict in the European defence-industrial field
The A400M Project
Defence industrial policy – a sound security strategy or an economic fallacy
Neorealism, Security Cooperation, and Europe's Relative Gains Dilemma
Market Size and the Political Economy of European Defense
Cooperation and non cooperation in European defence procurement
Armaments decision-making
Profit Regulation of Defense Contractors and Prizes for Innovation
Coase Lecture ‐ The Inverted‐U Relationship Between Credit Access and Productivity Growth
Stability in Competition
Theory of international politics
Economic Incentives and the Defense Procurement Process
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |