Discontinuities in signaling behavior upon the decision for war
An analysis of China's prewar signaling behavior
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12700855 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Kai Quek (0000-0001-8403-4280, University of Hong Kong, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2015 |
| Volume | 15 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 279-317 |
| Publication date | 2015-01-24 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International Relations of the Asia-Pacific (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1470-482X • E-ISSN: 1470-4838 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/irap/lcu023 |
| OpenAlex | W3121129610 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 28 |
There is always a time gap between the decision for war and its implementation. I exploit this time gap to study how the signaling of resolve changes after the decision for war is made, based on the wars that China fought since 1949. I study the series of signals that China sent after it had made its decisions for war in Korea (1950), India (1962) and Vietnam (1979), and compare them with the signals sent just before the decisions were made. I find patterns in Chinese prewar signaling that reflect how strategic incentives for the signaling of resolve change before and after the decision for war. The study generates theoretical expectations on discontinuities in signaling behavior upon the decision for war – an unexplored research area with direct policy implications
China · Classification of discontinuities · Computer security · Economics · Exploit · Incentive · Market economy · Political science · Computer Science · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Mathematics · Political Conflict and Governance · Law
China's Militarized Interstate Dispute Behaviour 1949–1992
Uncertain Partners
Useful Adversaries
Surprise Attacks—Are They Inevitable? Moving Beyond the Orthodox–Revisionist Dichotomy
The Correlates of War Data On War
China's Use of Force, 1950–96, and Taiwan
Intelligence and the problem of strategic surprise∗
China's Road to the Korean War
Causes of War
Cheap Talk Diplomacy, Voluntary Negotiations, and Variable Bargaining Power1
Hindsight and Foresight
Analysis, War, and Decision
Chinese Conflict Calculus and Behavior
The Effects of Different Types of Military Mobilization on the Outcome of International Crises
Signaling Foreign Policy Interests
Can Cheap Talk Deter
The Personal Touch
Rationalist explanations for war
The Might of the Pen
Autocratic Audience Costs
Authoritarian Signaling, Mass Audiences, and Nationalist Protest in China
Feigning Weakness
Deterrence and International Conflict
Which Side Are You On? Bias, Credibility, and Mediation
Audience Costs
The Cost of Empty Threats
Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,38 |
| Citation span | 2018 - 2026 (9) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |