Which Side Are You On? Bias, Credibility, and Mediation

Bibliographic Data

ID6231328
AuthorsAndrew H Kydd (0000-0002-9837-4793, Harvard University Press, corresponding author), Andrew Kydd
Year2003
Volume47
Issue4
Pages597
Publication date2003-10-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueAmerican Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907
PublisherJSTOR (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/3186121
OpenAlexW4234537617
LanguageEN
Citations received211
References cited46

Mediators are often thought to be more effective if they are unbiased or have no preferences over the issue in dispute. This article presents a game theoretic model of mediation drawing on the theory of “cheap talk” which highlights a contrary logic. Conflict arises in bargaining games because of uncertainty about the resolve of the parties. A mediator can reduce the likelihood of conflict by providing information on this score. For a mediator to be effective, however, the parties must believe that the mediator is telling the truth, especially if the mediator counsels one side to make a concession because their opponent has high resolve and will fight. An unbiased mediator who is simply interested in minimizing the probability of conflict will have a strong incentive to make such statements even if they are not true, hence the parties will not find the mediator credible. Only mediators who are effectively “on your side” will be believed if they counsel restraint

Adversary · Cheap talk · Computer security · Credibility · Economics · Incentive · International conflict · Mediation · Mediator · Microeconomics · Political science · Politics · Computer Science · Conflict Management and Negotiation · Game Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Medicine · Psychology · Social Psychology

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