Why “cheap” threats are meaningful
Threat perception and resolve in North Korean propaganda
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 11895617 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Lauren Sukin (0000-0002-5775-8790, Stanford University, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2022 |
| Volumen | 48 |
| Número | 5 |
| Páginas | 936-967 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2022-06-17 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | International Interactions (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0305-0629 • E-ISSN: 1547-7444 |
| Editorial | Taylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/03050629.2022.2068542 |
| OpenAlex | W4283030855 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 8 |
| Referencias citadas | 54 |
Threatening propaganda—particularly when extreme and frequent—is often considered “cheap talk.” However, this article argues systematic and comprehensive analysis of such threats can still lend valuable insights. In particular, the aggregate content of threats reveals information about the threat perceptions of the messenger, while the frequency of threats provides information about the messenger’s resolve. To test this theory, I analyze a comprehensive dataset of North Korean propaganda between 1996 and 2018, showing that North Korea systematically issues threats to its adversaries when they engage in joint military exercises or when they take steps, such as the development of missile defenses, that challenge the survivability or deterrent capability of the North Korean nuclear arsenal. Additionally, North Korea’s rhetoric signals its resolve. As the volume of North Korean threats increases, so too does the likelihood that North Korea will engage in military provocations, including nuclear and missile tests.La propaganda amenazante, especialmente cuando es extrema y frecuente, generalmente se considera "discurso barato". Sin embargo, este artículo sostiene que un análisis sistemático e integral de dichas amenazas puede aportar observaciones valiosas. En concreto, el contenido global de las amenazas revela información sobre las percepciones de la amenaza del mensajero, mientras que la frecuencia de las amenazas proporciona información sobre la resolución del mensajero. Para probar esta teoría, analizo un conjunto detallado de datos de propaganda de Corea del Norte de entre 1996 y 2018, que muestra que Corea del Norte envía amenazas sistemáticamenta a sus adversaries cuando participant en ejercicios militares conjuntos o cuando toman medidas que desafían la capacidad de supervivencia o de dissuasion del arsenal nuclear norcoreano, como el desarollo de defensa con misiles. Además, la retórica de Corea del Norte indica resolución. A medida que las amenazas de Corea del Norte aumentan, también lo hacen sus probabilidades de involucrarse en provocaciones militares, como pruebas nucleares y de misiles.La propagande menaçante – particulièrement lorsqu’elle est extrême et fréquente – est souvent considérée comme étant de la « conversation libre ». Cependant, cet article soutient qu’une analyse systématique et exhaustive de telles menaces peut tout de même apporter de précieux renseignements. En particulier, le contenu agrégé des menaces révèle des informations concernant la manière dont le messager perçoit ces menaces, alors que la fréquence des menaces offre des informations sur la détermination du messager. Pour mettre cette théorie à l’épreuve, j’analyse un jeu de données complet portant sur la propagande nord-coréenne entre 1996 et 2018 et je montre que la Corée du Nord émet systématiquement des menaces envers ses adversaires lorsqu’ils s’engagent dans des exercices militaires conjoints ou lorsqu’ils entreprennent des démarches, telles que le développement de défenses antimissiles, qui remettent en cause la capacité de survie ou de dissuasion de l’arsenal nucléaire nord-coréen. De plus, la rhétorique de la Corée du Nord signale sa détermination. Plus le volume des menaces nord-coréennes augmente, plus il en va de même pour la probabilité que la Corée du Nord se livre à des provocations militaires, notamment à des essais nucléaires et de missiles
China · Humanities · Political science · Survivability · Terrorism · Computer Science · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Korean Peninsula Historical and Political Studies · Law · Nuclear Issues and Defense · Philosophy
Título no disponible
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| Obras citantes distintas | 8 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 4 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2024 - 2026 (3) |
| Velocidad de citación | current |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 8 |