Congressional certification
How firms use former C ongress members to lobby on their behalf
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12705319 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Richard S Brown (0000-0001-7271-8300, Pennsylvania State University—Harrisburg Middletown Pennsylvania USA, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2018 |
| Volume | 18 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Publication date | 2018-04-17 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Public Affairs (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1472-3891 • E-ISSN: 1479-1854 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1002/pa.1711 |
| OpenAlex | W2802062779 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 36 |
This paper models the effect of firm‐level profitability (earnings before interest and taxes and return on sales) against certification by former members of the U.S. Congress. Although some scholars have studied certification, none have studied certification in the public policy market as is done in the current work. Likewise, although scholars have studied the effects of lobbying and political connections on firms' outcomes, none have studied lobbying through former Congress members specifically. The findings confirm that, after controlling for numerous factors, firms can use former Congress members to effectively lobby and certify their intentions. Both firm‐level earnings before interest and taxes and return on sales were significantly associated with prior lobbying efforts by these former elected federal officials in several different estimation techniques employed in the study
Business · Certification · Earnings · Economics · Management · Political science · Politics · Profitability index · Public economics · Work (physics · Corporate Finance and Governance · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Private Equity and Venture Capital · Accounting · Finance
Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
Reputation and imperfect information
Politicians on the Board of Directors
The Social Construction of Reputation
Building the firm's political (lobbying) strategy
Firm-level political capabilities and subsequent financial performance
Exploring the management of the corporate public affairs function in a dynamic global environment
Lessons from a crisis
The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance
Random Coefficient Models for Time-Series—Cross-Section Data
| Citations per year | 0.29 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2019 - 2024 (6) |
| Highly cited | No |