Do human rights treaty obligations matter for ratification
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12720331 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Suzie Mulesky (0000-0003-1600-7015, Vanguard (United States)), Wayne Sandholtz (0000-0002-8314-0038, University of Southern California, corresponding author), Kelebogile Zvobgo (0000-0001-8701-8016, William & Mary) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 23 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 1-18 |
| Publication date | 2023-11-15 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Human Rights (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1475-4835 • E-ISSN: 1475-4843 |
| Publisher | Taylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/14754835.2023.2267578 |
| OpenAlex | W4388694920 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 38 |
International relations scholarship assumes that states weigh the costs and benefits of treaty ratification. In human rights, the worse a particular state's record, the higher the presumptive costs of ratification and the lower the likelihood of ratification. But prior work neglects variation in the extent of obligation that different treaties create. In this article, we argue and demonstrate that (1) human rights treaties differ substantially in the scope and scale of the obligations they contain, (2) this variation can be measured, and (3) it matters for ratification. Treaties that create a larger number of demanding obligations imply greater potential costs of compliance for states. The larger the number of demanding obligations, the more grounds various actors will have to challenge a state's practices. We analyze innovative data on treaty obligations and commitments for the 10 core global human rights treaties to test our propositions, and we find strong support
Human rights · Law and economics · Obligation · Political science · Politics · Ratification · Scholarship · Scope (computer science · Sociology · State (computer science · Treaty · Global Peace and Security Dynamics · Human Rights and Development · International Law and Human Rights · Law
Institutional structure
Committed to Rights
How International Law Works
World society and human rights
Socializing States
The Global Diffusion of Markets and Democracy
The Continent of International Law
Contentious Compliance
Mobilizing for Human Rights
Domestic law and human rights treaty commitments
Negotiated rights
Defending the watchdogs
Global Human Rights and State Sovereignty
Hard and Soft Commitments to Human Rights Treaties, 1966–2000 1
The Origins of Human Rights Regimes
Explaining Commitment
Looking beyond Ratification
Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties
Avoiding Obligation
Rewards for Ratification
Reserving Rights
Democracy and Compliance with Human Rights Treaties
Ratification Patterns and the International Criminal Court1
Introduction
The Concept of Legalization
Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation
Credible Commitments and the International Criminal Court
International Integration and National Corruption
Is There a Broader-Deeper Trade-off in International Multilateral Agreements
Making Promises, Keeping Promises
Human Rights Institutions, Sovereignty Costs and Democratization
Social Pressure in the International Human Rights Regime
The Ideology of Childhood and the State
Sovereignty Relinquished? Explaining Commitment to the International Human Rights Covenants, 1966-1999
An Empirical Evaluation of Explanations for State Repression
World Society and the Nation-State
| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2 |
| Citation span | 2024 - 2026 (3) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 4 |