Avoiding Obligation
Reservations to Human Rights Treaties
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6284158 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Daniel W Hill (0000-0003-4978-2085, University of Georgia, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2016 |
| Volume | 60 |
| Issue | 6 |
| Pages | 1129-1158 |
| Publication date | 2016-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002714567947 |
| OpenAlex | W2073309418 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 21 |
| References cited | 51 |
This article examines the decisions of governments to enter reservations upon ratification of international human rights treaties. I argue that, in the context of the human rights regime, reservations are simply attempts to avoid international legal obligations where they would be consequential. I develop an explanation for their use that focuses on the following two factors: the legal constraints that already exist in domestic law and the likelihood that international agreements will be enforced by domestic courts. Using an original measure of domestic legal protection of civil, political, and personal integrity rights, I find evidence that governments are more likely to enter reservations when domestic legal standards are lax compared to those in the treaty and when judiciaries are likely to enforce treaty-based obligations. This suggests that full adoption of international human rights treaties is more likely when treaties will not create genuine domestic legal constraints and that explanations for treaty adoption and implementation must take reservations into account. It also suggests that adoption of international human rights law is best explained by the specific legal institutions that relate to domestic enforcement rather than broad distinctions between democratic/autocratic political institutions
Autocracy · Context (archaeology · Democracy · Economics · Enforcement · Human rights · International human rights law · International law · Law and economics · Obligation · Political science · Politics · Ratification · Treaty · Human Rights and Development · International Law and Human Rights · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law
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| Unique citing works | 21 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,1 |
| Citation span | 2016 - 2026 (11) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 21 |