The `Fido'-Fido Theory of Belief

Bibliographic Data

ID12750109
AuthorsStephen Schiffer (corresponding author)
Year1987
Volume1
Pages455-455
Publication date1987-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophical Perspectives (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1520-8583 • E-ISSN: 1758-2245
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.2307/2214153
OpenAlexW2017490514
LanguageEN
Citations received15
References cited2

Many will agree with Gareth Evans (1982) that there are what he called Russellian thoughts: thoughts that are about objects and whose contents cannot be specified without reference to those objects. The thought that I express when I say 'I am contemplating my future' is Russellian, and it is plausible that the same would be true of a thought expressed by an utterance of 'This is enjoyable', when the object in question is a visible book, and of a thought expressed by an utterance of 'Michael Innes is J. I. M. Stewart'. But merely to know that the content of my belief that Fido is a dog includes Fido is not yet to know what that content is. According to one view, the content of my belief is a singular whose only constituents are Fido and doghood, a proposition that may be represented by the ordered couple

Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology

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