Presidential Particularism and Mayoral Elections

Dados Bibliográficos

ID12761007
AutoresHeonuk Ha (0000-0002-5614-5095), J A Jenkins (0000-0001-7426-3370)
Ano2025
Volume25
Fascículo2
Páginas270-281
Data de publicação2025-01-22
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoState Politics & Policy Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 1532-4400 • E-ISSN: 1946-1607
EditoraCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/spq.2024.32
OpenAlexW4406708285
IdiomaEN
Referências citadas25

Amid the growing trend of political polarization and nationalization of US politics, the link between federal and local governments has become increasingly significant in the American public policy process. Consequently, the president, as party leader, has increasingly supported co-partisan candidates, not only in federal elections but also in subnational ones. Incorporating 1,124 contested partisan local elections for 399 cities with populations exceeding 50,000 between 2005 and 2020, we investigate how the president strategically employs federal funds to assist co-partisan mayoral candidates. Using two-way fixed effects models, we find that the president distributes more block and project grants to swing cities with co-partisan mayors during mayoral election years. We do not find that the president disproportionately allocates grants to co-partisan mayors in swing cities during non-mayoral election years; instead, jurisdictions are rewarded irrespective of their electoral value

Political science · Politics · Presidential system · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Political and Economic history of UK and US · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Public Administration