The Politician’s Province

Bibliographic Data

ID12802491
AuthorsWilliam G Howell (0000-0003-1733-2127, corresponding author), Stephane Wolton (0000-0003-1405-650X)
Year2018
Volume13
Issue2
Pages119-146
Publication date2018-05-23
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueQuarterly Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1554-0626 • E-ISSN: 1554-0634
PublisherNow Publishers (PUBLISHER • NL)
DOI10.1561/100.00017104
OpenAlexW3123236805
LanguageEN
Citations received11
References cited42

Politicians, especially executives, regularly seek to project their influence into new policy domains. In some instances, they do so only after having secured the requisite statutory authority; in others, they intervene without prior authorization, hoping that their actions henceforth serve as precedent for future policy involvement. To investigate the conditions under which politicians pursue one strategy versus another, we study a stylized model of authority acquisition that recognizes the electoral pressures under which executives operate. We show that politicians seek authority that is both more secure and broader in scope as the public support for their policy position increases even if— indeed, precisely because — their opponent stands to benefit from this authority if elected to office. Far from tying their opponents’ hands, as a number of literatures suggests, incumbents have electoral incentives to liberate them

Business · CONTEST · Economics · Incentive · Law and economics · Market economy · Microeconomics · Political science · Pooling · Position (finance · Public relations · Scope (computer science · Statutory law · Stylized fact · Tying · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Law · Media Influence and Politics · Public Administration · Finance

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