An Assessment of the Positive Theory of 'Congressional Dominance
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6300875 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Terry M Moe (corresponding author) |
| Year | 1987 |
| Volume | 12 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 475 |
| Publication date | 1987-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Legislative Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0362-9805 • E-ISSN: 1939-9162 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.2307/439745 |
| OpenAlex | W2035593435 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 161 |
| References cited | 28 |
The positive theory of argues that Congress controls the bureaucracy. This article offers a critical assessment, in two parts. The first outlines the logical foundation of the theory, suggests why it is unsuited to an analysis of bureaucratic control, and argues that any conclusions of congressional dominance are logically unwarranted. The second addresses in detail the theory's best known empirical application-a study of the FTC, as reported in various articles by Weingast, Calvert, and Moran-and argues that it does not in fact support the theory's claims
Biology · Dominance (genetics · Economics · Political science · Positive economics · Economic Theory and Institutions · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Local Government Finance and Decentralization
Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy
The American Congress
Presidential Power
Executives—The American Presidency
Governing with Judges
The Engines of European Integration
Committee Assignments, Constituent Preferences, and Campaign Contributions
Public Policy and Political Dysfunction
Governance reorganization and resilience
The Purpose‐Driven Congress
Foreign investor reactions to risk and uncertainty in antitrust
The Political Economy of Fema Disaster Payments
Symbolic Representation in Police Traffic Stops
Making Space
September 11 and the Adaptation Failure of U.S. Intelligence Agencies
Recovery and Reinvestment Act spending at the state level
Account-Holding Intensity
Strategy, Structure, and the Administration of Complex Geographies
Regulatory Policymaking in the American States
The Federal Communications Commission and the Communications Policymaking Process
How the Supreme Court Alters Opinion Language to Evade Congressional Review
Measuring Latent Constructs in Nonprofit Surveys with Item Response Theory
Agency problems and interest representation
Explaining variation in evidence-based policy making in the American states
Agents, Principals, or Something in Between? Bureaucrats and Policy Control in Thailand
Legislative Professionalism and Influence on State Agencies
Senate Gate-Keeping, Presidential Staffing of “Inferior Offices,” and the Ideological Composition of Appointments to the Public Bureaucracy
The Politician’s Province
Expanding the Limits of Power
Separation of Powers and the Politics of Administrative Rule Review
The new political economy of regulation
Member States and International Institutions
Bureaucratic Performance and Control in British Politics
Congressional Acquiescence to Presidentialism in the US ‘War on Terror’
Introduction
Comparing the Power of Korean and American Presidents
Social spending targets in IMF concessional lending
Are the reluctant warriors out of control? Why the U.S. military is averse to responding to post‐cold war low‐level threats
Crisis on the Border
Interests, Institutions, and Positive Theory
State Capacity and Bureaucratic Autonomy in the Early United States
Guarding the Guardians
Domestic politics and the power to punish
Interbranch Competition Over Control of Federal Agencies and the Selection of Career Executives
Building Reliable Theories of the Presidency
The Administrative Presidency and Bureaucratic Control
Implementing Executive Orders in the Administrative State
Organizational Complexity and Coordination Dilemmas in U.S. Executive Politics
The Presidency, the Bureaucracy, and Reinvention
Polarization, Excepted Appointments, and the Administrative Presidency
Superfund Expenditures and Cleanup Priorities
How does technology‐based monitoring affect street‐level bureaucrats' behavior? An analysis of body‐worn cameras and police actions
The Role of City Managers
A State-Level Examination of Bureaucratic Policymaking
Interest Group Influence on State Administrative Rule Making
Good Governance
Political control and policy-making uncertainty in executive orders
The political economy of tax enforcement
Trumping the Centers for Disease Control
Accountability, Bureaucratic Discretion, and Civil-Military Relations
Measuring the ideological preferences of U.S. presidents
Federal antitrust enforcement
Entry barriers and medical board funding autonomy
Congressional Dominance and the International Trade Commission
First branch, or root? the Congress, the President, and the Federal Reserve
Legislative committees as loyalty-generating institutions
The decision to lobby bureaucrats
Congressional voting on Superfund
Limitations of rational-choice institutionalism for the study of Latin American politics
The Influence of Corporate Lobbying on Federal Contracting
Conditionalities and the Performance of European Structural Funds
Reputation and Public Administration
The spy who loved me? Cross‐partisans in the core executive
The parliamentary scrutiny of euro area national central banks
Multiple principals, multiple problems
Self‐interest in public administration
Efficacy of Congressional Oversight
A policy solution to the European Union's transposition puzzle
The principal-agent approach and the study of the European Union
Member states and the European Commission
Delegation, agency, and agenda setting in the European Community
The Third Force? Independent Regulatory Agencies and Elected Politicians in Europe
Statutory discretion and procedural control of the European commission's executive functions
Political and stakeholder’s ties in European Union agencies
Agency growth between autonomy and accountability
The Path to European Integration
A democracia no Brasil
As três versões do neo-institucionalismo
Overseeing Oversight
Salience, Complexity, and the Legislative Direction of Regulatory Bureaucracies
Connecting the Dots in Public Management
A Bureaucratic-Centered Image of Governance
Political Control and Bureaucratic Autonomy Revisited
Agency Policy Making and Political Control
Political Economy Considerations on the Supply of Trade Protection in Regional Integration Agreements
The Institutional Sources of Military Doctrine
Congress, Foreign Policy, and the New Institutionalism
On the distributional effects of principal-agent problems
Theory and Practice of Delegation to Non-Majoritarian Institutions
Conflict among Regulators and the Hypothesis of Congressional Dominance
Congress, keystone of the Washington establishment
Specification Tests for the Multinomial Logit Model
Gatekeeping and Monopoly Power of Committees
Interests, Institutions, and Positive Theory
A political theory of regulation with some observations on railway abandonments
Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo
Legislative choice of regulatory forms
Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice
The congressional-bureaucratic system
Congress
Regulatory Bureaucracy
The Giant Jigsaw Puzzle
Congress and Regulatory Agency Choice
Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission
Regulatory Policymaking at the Federal Trade Commission
Uncovered Sets and Sophisticated Voting Outcomes with Implications for Agenda Institutions
Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models
The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure
Political Preferences for the Pork Barrel
A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms
Congressional Oversight Overlooked
The New Economics of Organization
A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence
The New Institutionalism
An Adaptive Model of Bureaucratic Politics
Political Disequilibrium and Scientific Inquiry
| Unique citing works | 161 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 4,13 |
| Citation span | 1987 - 2026 (40) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | Yes |
| Citation types | Neutral: 161 |