Senate Gate-Keeping, Presidential Staffing of “Inferior Offices,” and the Ideological Composition of Appointments to the Public Bureaucracy
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 12802700 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Adam Bonica (0000-0002-3004-9441, autor correspondente), Jowei Chen, Tim Johnson (0000-0003-3014-9722) |
| Ano | 2015 |
| Volume | 10 |
| Fascículo | 1 |
| Páginas | 5-40 |
| Data de publicação | 2015-05-20 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Não |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Quarterly Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 1554-0626 • E-ISSN: 1554-0634 |
| Editora | Now Publishers (PUBLISHER • NL) |
| DOI | 10.1561/100.00012085 |
| OpenAlex | W2244440120 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 27 |
| Referências citadas | 31 |
Article II Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution gives both the Senate and the President a role in the appointment of public bureaucrats. Yet, since the drafting of that constitutional passage, changes within the Senate and Executive have created new ways for officials to influence who gets appointed to the public bureaucracy. The Senate has developed intricate vetting procedures within its committees, while the Executive Branch has created new methods — such as the Schedule C designation — to facilitate the unilateral staffing of “inferior offices.” To what extent do these institutional changes affect the ideological composition of appointments to the public bureaucracy? Our formal theory predicts that the investigative procedures of Senate committees allow chairs to block ideologically disparate nominations, thus compelling presidents to nominate moderates to Senate-confirmed post while placing extremists in Schedule C positions. Empirical analyses support these predictions: the probability of Senate confirmation declines with a nominee’s ideological distance from the relevant committee chair and Schedule C appointees exhibit greater ideological extremism than Senate-confirmed appointees. These findings reveal how modern, institutional modifications of Article II Section 2 influence both the ideological composition of appointed federal bureaucrats and the struggle for power between branches of the U.S. federal government
Bureaucracy · Composition (language · Ideology · Political science · Politics · Presidential system · Public relations · Staffing · American Constitutional Law and Politics · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Legal and Constitutional Studies · Public Administration
Party Defection in Senate Confirmations of Executive Nominees
Policy Disruption Through Regulatory Delay in the Trump Administration
Loyalty–Competence Trade‐offs for Top U.S. Federal Bureaucratic Leaders in the Administrative Presidency Era
Under Pressure
Presidential Strategy amidst the “Broken” Appointments Process
Legislative responses to shared executive authority
Going for Goals
Getting the message across
Mapping the Political Contours of the Regulatory State
Are Donation-Based Measures of Ideology Valid Predictors of Individual-Level Policy Preferences
The Constraining Power of the Purse
What Explains Agency Heads’ Length of Tenure? Testing Managerial Background, Performance, and Political Environment Effects
Toward an Ideological Common Space
Estimating Candidates’ Political Orientation in a Polarized Congress
The Structure of Appointment Politics
Appointee vacancies in US executive branch agencies
Agency control through the appointed hierarchy
Appointments and attrition
Elections, Ideology, and Turnover in the US Federal Government
The Incompetence Trap
Bureaucratic Politics
The Who, When, and Where of Executive Nominations
The Role of Advisory Committees in Bureaucratic Oversight
American Civil-Military Relations and Presidential Power of Removal
The When and Why of Nominations
Control without Confirmation
Who Polices the Administrative State
The Politics of Presidential Appointments
Already Buried and Sinking Fast
Senate confirmation of cabinet nominations
Avoiding Advice and Consent
The Appointments Process and the Administrative Presidency
Revisiting the Administrative Presidency
Reliable and unreliable partisan appointees to the Board of Governors
Advice and Consent
Testing Pendleton's Premise
Senate Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices
Adding Recess Appointments to the President's “Tool Chest” of Unilateral Powers
Expert Opinion, Agency Characteristics, and Agency Preferences
An Assessment of the Positive Theory of 'Congressional Dominance
Confirmation Dynamics
Deference or Preference
Federal employee unionization and presidential control of the bureaucracy
Presidential Appointments and Personnel
The Politics of Supreme Court Nominations
Mapping the Ideological Marketplace
The Lengthened Shadow of Another Institution? Ideal Point Estimates for the Executive Branch and Congress
Senatorial Delay in Confirming Federal Judges, 1947-1998
Delaying Justice(s)
Separated Powers in the United States
Ideology and Interests in the Political Marketplace
From Abe Fortas to Zoë Baird
Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees
The Selection of Federal Political Executives
| Obras citantes distintas | 27 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 2,7 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2016 - 2026 (11) |
| Velocidade de citação | current |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 27 |