Salience, Complexity, and the Legislative Direction of Regulatory Bureaucracies
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6294152 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Evan J Ringquist (Indiana University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2003 |
| Volume | 13 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 141-164 |
| Publication date | 2003-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1053-1858 • E-ISSN: 1477-9803 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/jpart/mug013 |
| OpenAlex | W1966703745 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 135 |
| References cited | 20 |
Questions regarding the political control of administrative agencies have played a major role in reinvigorating the study of bureaucracy. Scholars have employed increasingly sophisticated analyses to demonstrate that it is possible, even likely, for elected officials to direct bureaucratic behavior. But while theoretical models derive expectations regarding both the propensity and the effectiveness of efforts at political control, nearly all empirical research has focused on only the latter. In this article we extend empirical analyses to study under what conditions efforts at political control of the bureaucracy are more or less likely. Specifically, we assess the effects that public salience and technical complexity have on the willingness of elected officials to use legislation to direct the behavior of four federal regulatory agencies from 1949 to 1996. The results from these analyses demonstrate the utility of using the core concepts of salience and complexity to predict the likelihood of legislative direction of agency behavior
Agency (philosophy · Bureaucracy · Cognitive psychology · Economics · Empirical research · Law and economics · Legislation · Legislature · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Salience (neuroscience · Social science · Sociology · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Psychology · Public Policy and Administration Research · Regulation and Compliance Studies · Law · Public Administration
Nonpunctuated and Sweeping Policy Change
Bureaucratic Capacity and Bureaucratic Discretion
Interest Group Competition on Federal Agency Rules
Anticipatory Governance
Preconditions, processes and structures
American Imperialism and the State, 1893–1921
State legislative committee deliberations
Knowledge utilization in the regulatory state
Network Ties and Congressional Delegation to U.S. Federal Agencies
The Headless Fourth Branch
Political Transactions, the Social Contract, and Administrative Power
Systematically Reviewing American Law and Public Administration
Managing Wildlife within U.S. National Forests
Scientific Controversy, Issue Salience, and E‐Cigarette Regulation
Fracking and environmental protection
Representation, Salience, and Responsiveness to Latino Student Performance
Political Insulation and Legislative Interventions
Governing controversial science
Absenteeism in the General Assembly of the United Nations
Regional Power Revisited
Legislative direction of regulatory bureaucracies
Legislative oversight of EU agencies through hearings
Sweet-Talking the Fourth Branch
Studying small states in international security affairs
More delegation, more political control? Politicization of senior-level appointments in 18 European countries
Congressional Use of Authorization and Oversight
Keeping tabs on the executive
Presidential Rhetoric and Supreme Court Decisions
Understanding commenter influence during agency rule development
Citizen groups and scientific decisionmaking
Evaluating Political Signals
A State-Level Examination of Bureaucratic Policymaking
Administering Public Participation
Employee Engagement Among Public Employees
Goal Ambiguity, Work Complexity, and Work Routineness in Federal Agencies
Informal Rules and Institutional Balances on the Boards of EU Agencies
Trumping the Centers for Disease Control
Industry size and regulation
Federal and State Public Forest Administration in the New Millennium
Agencies on the parliamentary radar
Of Politics and Purpose
Theorizing and Explaining Voluntary Accountability
Inequality in Agency Response
Policy properties and political influence in post-delegation
Relying on agencies in major European Union legislative measures
The European Parliament oversight of EU agencies through written questions
Lobbying Institutional Key Players
Explaining Participation Bias in the European Commission's Online Consultations
The European Parliament’s oversight powers in economic governance
A Bias Towards Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy
An Integrated Model of U.S. State Attorney General Behavior in Multi-State Litigation
The Politics of Race, Administrative Appeals, and Medicaid Disenrollment in Tennessee
Ecology of National Rule Birth
Agency Structure and the Distribution of Federal Spending
Regulatory Delay and Rulemaking Deadlines
The Importance of Oversight and Agency Capacity in Enhancing Performance in Public Service Delivery
The scope of accountability of international organisations
How Politics Shapes the Growth of Rules
Salience and Complexity in Supranational Policymaking
Explaining accountability for public policies
Building a Better Speed Trap
Politicians, regulators, and regulatory governance
For fear of popular politics? Public attention and the delegation of authority to the United States executive branch
Shall the law set them free? The formal and actual independence of regulatory agencies
Mass Administrative Reorganization, Media Attention, and the Paradox of Information
Assessing Regulatory Participation by Health Professionals
The Effects of Party and Agenda Control
Trans‐Subsystem Dynamics
Pet Sounds
Multiple Principals, Multiple Signals
Judicial Procedures as Instruments of Political Control
Agency Design as an Ongoing Tool of Bureaucratic Influence
Explaining the Accountability of Independent Agencies
Credit claiming and mayoral preferences for project uptake amid a migrant crisis
Salience, complexity and state resistance to federal mandates
Regulatory Democracy Reconsidered
Organizational Reputation, the Content of Public Allegations, and Regulatory Communication
Deliberate Indiscretion? How Political Corruption Encourages Discretionary Policy Making
Antitrust Law and Distributive Politics in the American States
Beyond Implementation
Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission
The Politics of U.S. Antitrust Regulation
Divided Government and the Design of Administrative Procedures
Regulatory Issue Networks in a Federal System
An Assessment of the Positive Theory of 'Congressional Dominance
The Decline of Private Bills
The Dynamics of Political-Bureaucratic Adaptation
Regulatory Performance and Presidential Administration
Administrative Procedures, Information, and Agency Discretion
The Legislative Impact of Divided Government
The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure
Political Control and Policy Impact in EPA's Office of Water Quality
Does Politics Make a Difference at the EEOC
Congressional Oversight Overlooked
What To Do (and Not to Do) with Time-Series Cross-Section Data
Can Government Regulate Safety? The Coal Mine Example
The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy
Political Control Versus Expertise
Adaptive Signal Processing, Hierarchy, and Budgetary Control in Federal Regulation
| Unique citing works | 79 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 6,14 |
| Citation span | 2004 - 2025 (22) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | Yes |
| Citation types | Neutral: 132 |