Agency Design as an Ongoing Tool of Bureaucratic Influence
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6300920 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Christopher Reenock (0000-0003-0108-7198, Florida State University), Sarah Poggione (Florida International University) |
| Year | 2004 |
| Volume | 29 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 383-406 |
| Publication date | 2004-08-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Legislative Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0362-9805 • E-ISSN: 1939-9162 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.3162/036298004x201221 |
| OpenAlex | W2052165668 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 8 |
| References cited | 40 |
Theoretical work assumes that legislators use ex ante design to gain bureaucratic influence, not only at an agency's appointment stage but also as an ongoing tactic. Yet no empirical work has investigated whether or not legislators prefer to use design to exert influence after an agency's appointment stage. Using a mail survey of more than 2,500 legislators, we model legislators' preferences for ex ante design as a function of both institutional factors and individual legislators' characteristics. Our results suggest that the feasibility of agency design as an ongoing tactic of bureaucratic influence is more limited than theoretical work indicates and that both institutional‐ and individual‐level factors explain legislators' preferences
Agency (philosophy · Bureaucracy · Economics · Ex-ante · Function (biology · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Sociology · Work (physics · Engineering · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Public Administration · Regulation and Compliance Studies
Political Insulation and Legislative Interventions
The evolution of consensus through coordinated action
Assessing the Impact of Legislative Lobbying Regulations on Interest Group Influence in U.S. State Legislatures
Oversight Capabilities in the States
A Race for the Regs
Bureaucratic Effectiveness and Influence in the Legislature
Loose Ties or Strong Bonds? The Effect of a Commissioner's Nationality and Partisanship on Voting in the Council
Keepin’ on the Sunny Side
The administrative behavior of federal bureau chiefs
Congressional careers
Keeping a watchful eye
Delegating Powers
Structure and Process, Politics and Policy
Political Institutions
Commentary on "Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies"
Choosing Strategies to Control the Bureaucracy
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission
Agenda Setting and Legislative Success in State Legislatures
The Hidden 25 Percent
Member Career Opportunities and the Internal Organization of Legislatures
Divided Government and the Design of Administrative Procedures
Refusals
Understanding The Decision to Participate in a Survey
Agency Discretion and the Dynamics of Procedural Reform
Effectiveness of Administrative Controls
Regulatory Issue Networks in a Federal System
Legislative Professionalization and Membership Diversity in State Legislatures
The Costs of Control
Career Opportunities and Membership Stability in Legislatures
Agency Policy Making and Political Control
Managing Uncertainty through Bureaucratic Design
Salience, Complexity, and the Legislative Direction of Regulatory Bureaucracies
Legislatures and Statutory Control of Bureaucracy
Administrative Procedures, Information, and Agency Discretion
A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion
Administrative Procedures and Political Control of the Bureaucracy
Political Control Versus Expertise
Buying Time
| Unique citing works | 8 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,47 |
| Citation span | 2009 - 2022 (14) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 8 |