A Race for the Regs
Unified Government, Statutory Deadlines, and Federal Agency Rulemaking
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6301099 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jason A Macdonald (0000-0002-4227-243X, West Virginia University), Robert J Mcgrath (0000-0001-8963-3231, George Mason University) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 44 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 345-381 |
| Publication date | 2019-05-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Legislative Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0362-9805 • E-ISSN: 1939-9162 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/lsq.12228 |
| OpenAlex | W2905429175 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 58 |
Theory suggests that Congress should delegate more policymaking authority to the bureaucracy under unified government, where lawmakers are less worried about the president orchestrating “bureaucratic drift.” Yet, all unified governments come to an end, making broad delegations potentially advantageous to future lawmaking coalitions (“coalitional drift”). We seek to assess how lawmakers simultaneously limit the risk of each of these pitfalls of delegation. Our answer is rooted in Congress’s ability to spur agency rulemaking activity under unified government. Specifically, we expect statutes passed under unified government to require agencies to issue regulations quickly and for enacting coalitions to use oversight tools to influence agency policy choices. Such “proximate oversight” allows coalitions to cement policy decisions before a new election changes the configuration of preferences within Congress and the executive branch. We assess our argument using unique data on both congressional rulemaking deadlines (1995–2014) and the speed with which agencies issue regulations (1997–2014
Administrative law · Agency (philosophy · Argument (complex analysis · Bureaucracy · Delegate · Delegation · Divided government · Economics · Government (linguistics · Gridlock · Law and economics · Lawmaking · Legislature · Political science · Politics · Rulemaking · Separation of powers · Sociology · Statute · Statutory law · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Legal and Constitutional Studies · Public Administration
Keeping a watchful eye
Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House
Setting the Agenda
Working, Shirking, and Sabotage
Deliberate Discretion?
Trust
Delegating Powers
Structure and Process, Politics and Policy
Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy
Commentary on "Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies"
Who Controls the Bureaucracy?
Divided we govern
Event History Modeling
Bootstrap-Based Improvements for Inference with Clustered Errors
Congressional Power over Executive Branch Policy Making
The Complications of Controlling Agency Time Discretion
Designing Judicial Review
Reputation and Public Administration
Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission
The Politics of U.S. Antitrust Regulation
Investigating the President
Political Transaction Costs and the Politics of Administrative Design
Back-Channel Representation
Agency Design and Postlegislative Influence over the Bureaucracy
Overseeing Oversight
Constraining a Shadowy Future
Agency Design as an Ongoing Tool of Bureaucratic Influence
Congressional Oversight Hearings and Policy Control
Divided Government and Congressional Investigations
Retrospective Congressional Oversight and the Dynamics of Legislative Influence over the Bureaucracy
Divided We Quarrel
Regulatory Delay and Rulemaking Deadlines
Managing Uncertainty through Bureaucratic Design
Who Governs the American Administrative State? A Bureaucratic-Centered Image of Governance
Minority Governments in Parliamentary Democracies
Formal Models of Bureaucracy
Legislatures and Statutory Control of Bureaucracy
Keeping Tabs on Partners
Counteractive Lobbying
Cabinet Instability and Delegation in Parliamentary Democracies
Police Patrols and Fire Alarms
What's Happened to the Watchful Eye
Delegation and Discretion in Anticipation of Coalitional Drift
Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics
Coalition Termination and the Strategic Timing of Parliamentary Elections
The Partisan Basis of Procedural Choice
An Adaptive Model of Bureaucratic Politics
Regulatory Regimes, Agency Actions, and the Conditional Nature of Congressional Influence
Administrative Procedures and Political Control of the Bureaucracy
Adaptive Signal Processing, Hierarchy, and Budgetary Control in Federal Regulation
The Strategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress
Limitation Riders and Congressional Influence over Bureaucratic Policy Decisions
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2024 - 2024 (1) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |