Formal Models of Bureaucracy
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6232799 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Sean Gailmard (0000-0002-1742-5879, Charles & Louise Travers Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, California 94720), John W Patty (0000-0002-1142-9334, Department of Political Science and Center for Political Economy, Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, Missouri 63130) |
| Year | 2012 |
| Volume | 15 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 353-377 |
| Publication date | 2012-06-15 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Annual Review of Political Science (BOOK_SERIES) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1094-2939 • E-ISSN: 1545-1577 |
| Publisher | Annual Reviews (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1146/annurev-polisci-031710-103314 |
| OpenAlex | W2139011416 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 109 |
| References cited | 58 |
In the past decade, political science has witnessed a substantial amount of research using formal models to explicate the rationale for and effects of myriad aspects of bureaucratic institutions. Whereas previous waves of formal modeling on bureaucratic structure emphasized bureaucracy as a device for making policy commitments last, more recent formal research has grappled with information asymmetries and more explicitly considered the principal-agent relationship between bureaucracies and political authorities. We review several major recent themes in this literature, particularly the effects and development of bureaucratic hierarchies, the agency dilemmas inherent when policy-making authority is delegated to bureaucrats, and the effects of institutional structure on the development and sharing of expertise and capacity in bureaucracies
Agency (philosophy · Bureaucracy · Economics · Law and economics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Principal (computer security · Social science · Sociology · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Public Administration · Public Policy and Administration Research
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Giving Advice Versus Making Decisions
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Bayesian explanations for persuasion
Clarity or collaboration
Time constraints and the opportunity costs of oversight
Legislative bargaining and partisan delegation
Delegation and political turnover
Mediation in the shadow of an audience
Executive coalition building
Business as usual
Agency Structure and the Distribution of Federal Spending
Discretionary Authority and Prioritizing in Government Agencies
European Commission Officials' Policy Attitudes
No Substitute for Experience
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When Politics Matters
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Whistleblowing and Compliance in the Judicial Hierarchy
Competence and advice
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Fiscal legibility and state development
Electoral Ambiguity and Political Representation
Gridlock and Delegation in a Changing World
Getting Their Way
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Coercive Leadership
Absence
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Strategic Information Transmission
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Who Controls the Bureaucracy?
Expertise, Subversion, and Bureaucratic Discretion
The Politician and the Judge
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The presidential power of unilateral action
A Theory of Policy Expertise
Legislative choice of regulatory forms
The Limits of Bureaucratic Efficiency
Bayesian Models in Economic Theory
Job Market Signaling
Polarization and Publicity
The Politics of Biased Information
The Politics of Investigations and Regulatory Enforcement by Independent Agents and Cabinet Appointees
Divided Government and the Design of Administrative Procedures
Delegation and Positive-Sum Bureaucracies
Gatekeeping
Formal Models of Legislative/Administrative Interaction
Discretion Rather than Rules
Multiple Principals and Oversight of Bureaucratic Policy-Making
Strategic Appointments
Theories Ofdelegation
Slackers and Zealots
The Appointments Dilemma
Policy‐Specific Information and Informal Agenda Power
The Consequences of Cross-Cutting Networks for Political Participation
A Strategic Theory of Bureaucratic Redundancy
Administrative Procedures, Information, and Agency Discretion
Regulatory Errors with Endogenous Agendas
A Theory of Jurisdictional Assignments in Bureaucracies
A Formal Model of the Politics of Delegation in a Separation of Powers System
Transparency, Democratic Accountability, and the Economic Consequences of Monetary Institutions
Congressional Oversight Overlooked
Formal Models of Bureaucracy
Bureaucratic Capacity, Delegation, and Political Reform
The Limits of Delegation
Regulatory Quality Under Imperfect Oversight
Whistleblowing
Flexing Muscle
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| Unique citing works | 109 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 8,38 |
| Citation span | 2013 - 2026 (14) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | Yes |
| Citation types | Neutral: 108 |