Who is in charge here? Legislators, bureaucrats and the policy making process
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6316587 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Viktoryia Schnose (Washington University in St. Louis, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 23 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 342-363 |
| Publication date | 2017-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Party Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1354-0688 • E-ISSN: 1460-3683 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/1354068815597896 |
| OpenAlex | W1147517439 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 9 |
| References cited | 88 |
Scholars in comparative politics often assume that political parties are the primary instruments for translating citizens’ preferences into specific policy outcomes. However, the crucial but often forgotten link between preferences, parties, and outcomes is the bureaucracy. Are bureaucrats able to affect policy outside of parties’ control? And, if so, how does this bureaucratic policy drift differ across institutional contexts? I argue that institutions that regulate the nomination process by which parties in government select bureaucrats (meritocratic versus partisan recruitment) determine the levels of bureaucratic influence on the policy making process, specifically in terms of policy change. I test my theoretical argument using two large cross-national datasets on budget allocations and policy stability. I find that bureaucratic professionalism partially explains changes in allocation to the “ideological” budgetary categories and is positively correlated with policy stability around the world
Argument (complex analysis · Bureaucracy · Control (management · Economics · Government (linguistics · Ideology · Law and economics · Meritocracy · Nomination · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Process (computing · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Policy Transfer and Learning · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Public Administration
Punctuated Equilibrium in Latin American Democracies
Bureaucrats as policy makers
In the cradle of laws
Inside the Black Box
Can impact assessments tame legislative drift? Event history analysis of modifications of laws across Europe
Bureaucratic entrepreneurship and morality politics
Fragmentation of Political Authority and Bureaucratic Entrepreneurship
Peeking Behind the Arches
Studying Policy Design Quality in Comparative Perspective
Bureaucracy in the Modern State
The Political Economy of Public Administration
Policy Bureaucracy
Econometric Analysis of Panel Data
Politics of Bureaucracy
What Motivates Bureaucrats?
Inside Bureaucracy
Data Analysis Using Regression and Multilevel/Hierarchical Models
Analysis of Panel Data
The Politics of Presidential Appointments
Deliberate Discretion?
Delegating Powers
Political Institutions
Commentary on "Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies"
Who Controls the Bureaucracy?
Expertise, Subversion, and Bureaucratic Discretion
Presidents and the Politics of Structure
Party System Institutionalization and Party System Theory After the Third Wave of Democratization
Partisan theory after fifteen years
Bringing the State Back In
The Oxford Handbook of State and Local Government
The political consequences of electoral laws
Veto Players
Prime Minister, Cabinet and Core Executive
Political Parties, Growth and Equality
Analysis of Panel Data
Bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic performance in less developed countries
Patterns of Democracy
When parties matter
Generalized Estimating Equation Models for Correlated Data
Bayesian Models in Economic Theory
Efficient Estimation of Time-Invariant and Rarely Changing Variables in Finite Sample Panel Analyses with Unit Fixed Effects
Reaching Migrants in Survey Research
When Left Is Right
Political responses to interdependence
Advice and Consent
Modern social politics in Britain and Sweden
Divided Government and the Design of Administrative Procedures
Improving Tests of Theories Positing Interaction
The Merit of Meritocratization
A Lot More to Do
Understanding Interaction Models
Party System Institutionalization in 30 African Countries
Political Sequences and the Stabilization of Interparty Competition
Legislative Voting Behavior, Seen and Unseen
Comparing Cosponsorship and Roll‐Call Ideal Points
German Unification and Bureaucratic Transformation
Throwing Out the Baby with the Bath Water
Dirty Pool
Bureaucrats and Politicians in Britain
Left–right party ideology and government policies
Politics, Policies and Consequences
Partisan Politics and Fiscal Policy
The Quantity and the Quality of Party Systems
Formal Models of Bureaucracy
Time-Series–cross-Sectiondata
Theories Ofdelegation
The Politics of Competitive Federalism
Policy Responsiveness and Incumbent Reelection in State Legislatures
Slackers and Zealots
Administrative Procedures, Information, and Agency Discretion
Regression in Space and Time
Making the Most of Statistical Analyses
The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure
Congressional Oversight Overlooked
The Declining Talent Pool of Government
Do Parties Make a Difference? Parties and the Size of Government in Liberal Democracies
Modeling Multilevel Data Structures
Decision Making in Political Systems
Selection Effects in Roll Call Votes
Cabinet Reshuffles and Ministerial Drift
Electoral Connections
Modeling and Interpreting Interactive Hypotheses in Regression Analysis
What To Do (and Not to Do) with Time-Series Cross-Section Data
State Capacity and Economic Intervention in the Early New Deal
Bureaucratic Capacity, Delegation, and Political Reform
Regulatory Quality Under Imperfect Oversight
Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy
Emerging Conflicts in the Doctrines of Public Administration
Political Control Versus Expertise
Extracting Policy Positions from Political Texts Using Words as Data
Welfare Spending in Advanced Industrial Democracies, 1950-1980
| Unique citing works | 9 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,8 |
| Citation span | 2021 - 2026 (6) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 9 |