An Adaptive Model of Bureaucratic Politics
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3579025 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jonathan Bendor (0000-0002-6066-0815, Stanford University), Terry M Moe (Stanford University) |
| Year | 1985 |
| Volume | 79 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 755-774 |
| Publication date | 1985-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Political Science Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/1956842 |
| OpenAlex | W1980118650 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 88 |
| References cited | 33 |
In this article we outline a new framework for the formal analysis of bureaucratic politics. It departs from standard neoclassical approaches, notably those of Niskanen (1971) and Peltzman (1976), in several important respects. First our approach explicitly models a system of three-way interaction among bureaus, politicians, and interest groups. Second, it allows for institutional features of each type of participant. Third, it is a model of dynamic process. Fourth, participants make choices adoptively rather than optimizing. Fifth, participants are only minimally informed.The result is a dynamic model of adaptive behavior, very much in the spirit of Simon's (1947) behavioral tradition, that offers a new perspective on political control, bureaucratic power, and the "intelligence of democracy
Bureaucracy · Control (management · Democracy · Economic system · Economics · Epistemology · Law and economics · Management · Perspective (graphical · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Power (physics · Process (computing · Sociology · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Economic Theory and Institutions · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization
The Institutional Sources of Defense-Industrial Policy—Evidence from Poland
The Politics of Quasi-Government
Bounded Rationality
Issue Politics in Congress
The Politics of Public Service Bargains
Agile and adaptive governance in crisis response
Bureaucratic Politics Arising From, Not Defined by, a Principal-Agency Dyad
Bureaucratic control after Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo
Navigating the eye of the storm
Adaptive Incrementalism and Complexity
Political Transactions, the Social Contract, and Administrative Power
Is Ambiguity Good or Bad for Democratic Governance
Boon or bane for development? Turkey’s central state bureaucracy and the management of public investment
Bureaucratic Performance and Control in British Politics
A Model of the Arena of PA-Theory
Specialized Courts of Appeals' Review of Bureaucratic Actions and the Politics of Protectionism
Sweet-Talking the Fourth Branch
What Do We Do With Applied Research
The Revolution in Presidential Studies
Government Credible Commitment to the French and American Nuclear Power Industries
State Regulatory Principals and Local Bureaucratic Agents
The Dynamics of State Fiscal Behavior Over the Business Cycle
How Do Legislators Assess Administrative Performance? Georgia’s Department of Transportation in the Eyes of the State’s Legislators
Computer models of educational institutions
Applied Social Science, Policy Science, and the Federal Government
Incorporating Multiple Actors and Guidance Instruments into Models of Regulatory Policymaking
Merit Protection, Federal Agencies, and the New Personnel Management
Give a Little or Lose a Lot? The Effects of Increased Transparency on Local Applications for Federal Grant Funds
The ``Power of the Purse'' and its Implications for Bureaucratic Policy-Making
The deformation of democracy in the United States
T urf wars in government administration
The Bureau‐politics of Crisis Management
Understanding Government
Budgetary Process and Bureaucratic Control
The Organizational Roots of State Capacity
Agenda setting power and moral hazard in principal‐agent relationships
Agenda Control, Committee Capture, and the Dynamics of Institutional Politics
Formal Models of Legislative/Administrative Interaction
Bureaucracy and Democracy
Agency Evolution, New Institutionalism, and ‘Hybrid’ Policy Domains
An Assessment of the Positive Theory of 'Congressional Dominance
Who Influences the Fed? Presidential Versus Congressional Leadership
Public Administration at the Millennium
Taking Tough Choices Seriously
Organizational Reputations and the Observability of Public Warnings in 10 Pharmaceutical Markets
The politics of scarcity
Corporate Influence and the Regulatory Mandate
Bureaucratic Behavior in Strategic Environments
Partners in Advocacy
The Constraining Power of the Purse
Divided government and US federal rulemaking
Predicting Political Influence on State Ethics Commissions
When the Servant Is Also Master
Sharpening up Sabatier
Partisan Presidential Influence over US Federal Budgetary Outcomes
Who’s Whispering in Your Ear? The Influence of Third Parties Over State Agency Decisions
Legislators and Administrators
A Race for the Regs
Stabilization and Cutbacks
Agency Structure and the Distribution of Federal Spending
A Political Consequence of Contracting
Race and Gender Bias in Three Administrative Contexts
Who Takes Risks
The Post‐agencification Stage between Reforms and Crises. A Comparative Assessment of EU agencies' Budgetary Development
When Do Interest Groups Contact Bureaucrats Rather than Politicians? Evidence on Fire Alarms and Smoke Detectors from Japan
Anticipating Uncertainty
Formal Theory and the Institutions of Governance
When Policies Undo Themselves
The Americanist Bias in Organization Theory
The Effect of Salient Reputational Threats on the Pace of FDA Enforcement
Crossing the Organizational Void
Determinants of the Amount and Type of Corruption in State Fiscal Bureaucracies
A Theory of Jurisdictional Assignments in Bureaucracies
Goal Conflict and Fund Diversion in Federal Grants to the States
The Institutional Dynamics of Policy Administration
Formal Models of Bureaucracy
Interest Group Competition on Federal Agency Rules
Toward Better Theories of the Policy Process
Coping with Uncertainty
Electoral system effects and ruling party dominance in Japan
Principal-Agent Models of Political Control of Bureaucracy
Cooperative Regulatory Enforcement and the Politics of Administrative Effectiveness
Negative Decision Powers and Institutional Equilibrium
Adaptive Signal Processing, Hierarchy, and Budgetary Control in Federal Regulation
Principals, Bureaucrats, and Responsiveness in Clean Air Enforcements
Control and Feedback in Economic Regulation
Ownership Organization and Firm Performance
Comparing Varieties of Agency Theory in Economics, Political Science, and Sociology
Human problem solving
A Strategy of Decision
Regulating Business by Independent Commission
The Marasmus of the ICC
Bureaucrats and Politicians
Theories of Economic Regulation
The Theory of Economic Regulation
A behavioral theory of the firm
Structure of Decision
The Logic of Collective Action
Toward a general theory of managerial discretion
The Political Process
Congress, The Electoral Connection
Congress
An introduction to models in the social sciences
Federalism. Redundancy and System Reliability
"The Science of "Muddling Through
Power and Administration
Political Preferences for the Pork Barrel
Congressional Oversight Overlooked
Bureaucrats, Legislators, and the Size of Government
Clashing Beliefs Within the Executive Branch
Conflict and Complexity
Bounded Rationality in Budgetary Research
| Unique citing works | 88 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,15 |
| Citation span | 1985 - 2026 (42) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 87 |