Principal-Agent Models of Political Control of Bureaucracy
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3552350 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Brian J Cook (0000-0001-7563-7012, Clark University), B Dan Wood (Mitchell Institute) |
| Year | 1989 |
| Volume | 83 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 965-978 |
| Publication date | 1989-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Political Science Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/1962069 |
| OpenAlex | W2804848694 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 39 |
| References cited | 31 |
In the March 1988 issue of thisReview, B. Dan Wood invoked a principal-agent perspective to establish the importance of democratic hierarchies in shaping the outputs of public bureaucracies. He tested the model with air pollution enforcements of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) between 1977 and 1985. His results suggested some limitations on bureaucracies' responsiveness to elected political institutions, consistent with a principal-agent perspective with emphasis on the agent. Brian J. Cook challenges features of the design and empirical testing of Wood's hierarchical model. He questions the accuracy of Wood's characterization of the extent of EPA autonomy and power. Cook argues that a proper model requires recognition of the multiple principal nature of the U.S. system, and he advocates consideration of the normative foundations of principal-agent theory. Wood responds to both the substantive and methodological issues raised and suggests an eclectic approach in future research
Agency (philosophy · Autonomy · Bureaucracy · Computer security · Control (management · Corporate governance · Democracy · Economics · Law and economics · Management · Normative · Perspective (graphical · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Principal (computer security · Principal–agent problem · Social science · Sociology · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Law · Policy Transfer and Learning · Public Administration · Public Policy and Administration Research · Regulation and Compliance Studies
Exploration of principal-agent theory in a consultative policy-making context
Unpacking the accountability cube and its relationship with blame avoidance
Me versus them – interest-based conflict lines between tourists and residents
Understanding Plea Bargaining in a New Progressive DA’s Office
The Impact of Employee Perceptions of Inclusion in a Racially Diverse Agency
The Interactive Effect of Extrinsic Controls and Public Service Motivation on Blame Avoidance
Service Motivation under Political Pressure
Regulatory Policymaking in the American States
Alliance Embeddedness
Legislative Professionalism and Influence on State Agencies
Public Management and the Public Good
Illusions of Accountability
How does technology‐based monitoring affect street‐level bureaucrats' behavior? An analysis of body‐worn cameras and police actions
Deep learning and principal–agent problems of algorithmic governance
Control pliers in principal‐agent relations
Redirecting revenues from law enforcement fines, forfeitures, and related fees to fund local nonprofits
The Thinning of Administrative Institutions in the Hollow State
Entrepreneurs or Conservators
Public Policy, Overhead Democracy and the Professional State Revisited
First branch, or root? the Congress, the President, and the Federal Reserve
Political and Economic Influences On Private-Sector Pollution Control Costs
Strategies for dealing with policy ambiguities
Legal Control of Public Administration
Welfare Reform, Mississippi Style
Administrative Leadership, Neo-Managerialism, and the Public Management Movement
A ‘Fruitless Obsession with Accuracy
The Institutional Sources of Military Doctrine
The Pursuit of Political Control by Multiple Principals
Conflict among Regulators and the Hypothesis of Congressional Dominance
Principals, Agents, and the Impact of Regulatory Federalism on the Savings-and-Loans Crisis of the 1980s
Co‐enforcing Labor standards
Evaluating the Advocacy Coalition Framework
The Forest Ranger (and the Legislator)
Beyond Principals and Agents
Uses and limitations of performance measurement in the civil service
The Political Evolution of Principal-Agent Models
Cosmetic Responsiveness
Mounting Turbulence in Neoliberal Globalization
The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy
The administrative behavior of federal bureau chiefs
Inside Bureaucracy
Bureaucrats and Politicians
The Theory of Economic Regulation
Environmental Policy in the 1980s
The congressional-bureaucratic system
Congress, the Bureaucracy, and Public Policy
Democracy and the Public Service
Reforming Regulation
Clean Air
Environmental Policy in the 1980s
Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission
Promise and Performance. Choosing and Implementing an Environmental Policy
Mandates or Mandarins? Control and Discretion in the Modern Administrative State
Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public Policy
Regulatory Performance and Presidential Administration
Congressional Oversight Overlooked
An Adaptive Model of Bureaucratic Politics
Bureaucratic Expertise versus Legislative Authority
Principals, Bureaucrats, and Responsiveness in Clean Air Enforcements
The Political Economy of Federalism
Control and Feedback in Economic Regulation
Stacking the Deck
| Unique citing works | 39 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,11 |
| Citation span | 1991 - 2025 (35) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 39 |