The principal-agent approach and the study of the European Union
Promise Unfulfilled
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 7879978 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Kassim Hussein (corresponding author), Anand Menon (0000-0002-0304-6528) |
| Year | 2003 |
| Volume | 10 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 121-139 |
| Publication date | 2003-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of European Public Policy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1350-1763 • E-ISSN: 1466-4429 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/1350176032000046976 |
| OpenAlex | W2147804011 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 104 |
| References cited | 36 |
The principal-agent model holds great promise for understanding the institutional complexities of the EU and for moving beyond the sterile debate between intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism. As yet, however, scholars have failed to exploit the insights that this construct affords. After a brief discussion of the principal-agent model, this article offers a critical examination of the way that the principal-agent approach has been deployed by liberal intergovernmentalism, institutional intergovernmentalism, historical institutionalist supranationalism, and rational-choice supranationalism. It argues that, in all four cases, the a priori commitments of the theorists, in support either of the view that the member states effectively control their supranational agents and dominate EU governance or of the belief in an inevitable trend towards greater integration, led by supranational institutions, prevent them from making the most effective use of the model. It proposes alternative applications that may prove more fruitful
Construct (python library · Corporate governance · Economic system · Economics · Epistemology · European integration · European union · Exploit · Intergovernmentalism · International trade · Law and economics · Management · Political science · Positive economics · Principal (computer security · Sociology · Computer Science · European Union Policy and Governance · Political Systems and Governance · Social Policy and Reform Studies
Governing Europe
The EU Actorness in the Energy Relations with Algeria
Ruling Europe
Contentious Politics in Western Europe and the United States
The Changing European State
On Studying Governments
Comparing Economic Interest Organizations
Recasting European Welfare States
What Is New About Governance and Why Does It Matter?
The Principal–Agent Model, Accountability and Democratic Legitimacy
Unexplored variation in European integration research
Rethinking evaluation in European Union-funded tourism projects
La politique de concurrence au secours de l’exception culturelle
La fin de l’État stratège
Constructive ambiguity or stringent monitoring? Towards understanding UN Security Council oversight over non-UN-led forces
Examining conditionalities in Cohesion Policy
Analysing the Power of the European Union’s Diplomatic Service
The European External Action Service
Supranational Activism as an Assertion Process? The Case of Europol
The Politics of Delegation in European Banking Union
The output legitimacy of international organizations and the global public interest
Twenty Years of Principal-Agent Research in EU Politics
Sous l'emprise de la présidence
Unexplored Variation in European Integration Research
How the Commission fills in the blanks of the European Semester
Public Budgeting in the EU Commission
Vers des compétences externes
Agents of Destruction? Applying Principal-Agent Analysis to State-Sponsored Terrorism
Nato and EU in conflict regulation
Supranational agency and indirect governance after the Euro crisis
Functional and normative delegation to non-majoritarian institutions
The promise of the principal-agent approach for studying EU migration policy
The principal-agent approach to EU studies
Reforming EU economic governance
The discursive framing of European integration in EU-wide media
In the loop
Do Agents “Run Amok”? A Comparison of Agency Slack in the EU and US Trade Policy in the Doha Round
Parties and Governance—Extending the Territory
Co-financing and Principal–Agent Relationships in a Swiss Agri-environmental Programme
Unravelling the Puzzle of Social Standards’ Design in EU and US Trade Agreements
Our Dream is a World Full of Poverty Indicators
How does delegation structure shape agent discretion in EU foreign policy? Evidence from the Normandy Format and the Contact Group on Libya
Avoiding disciplinary garbage cans
Explaining the European commission’s strategies in times of crisis
What shapes the European Union’s sectoral integration with its neighbourhood? A look at the EU’s external relations in law enforcement
European Union Agencies’ Vertical Relationships with the Member States
A principal-agent analysis of inter-agency cooperation in EU border management
Sui generis no more? The ECB’s second decade
Conditions underlying agricultural land lease in Poland, in the context of the agency theory
WHO’s to blame? The World Health Organization and the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa
Why does bureaucratic corruption occur in the EU
Conditionalities and the Performance of European Structural Funds
Explaining the political use of evaluation in international organizations
The Role of the Commission in Intergovernmental Agreements in the Field of Energy. A Foot in the Door Technique
EU agencies
Pre- and Post-Lisbon
Weaponisation of finance
Explaining variation in the role of the EU Council Secretariat in first and second pillar policy-making
Where does implementation lie? Assessing the determinants of delegation and discretion in post-Maastricht European Union
The road to external representation
The countries they know best
Discretion by the rules
An elephant on the 13th floor of the Berlaymont? European Council and Commission relations in legislative agenda setting
The sovereign cloud’ in Europe
Strengthening the European Commission's budgetary and economic surveillance capacity since Greece and the euro area crisis
Variation in EU member states' preferences and the Commission's discretion in the Doha Round
The European Parliament oversight of EU agencies through written questions
The tables have turned on the European Commission
Regulating European Union lobbying
Principal–agent theory and the Open Method of Co-ordination
Committee Governance and Socialization in the European Union
Principals, agents, and the European Union's foreign economic policies
Waking a Dormant Legal Resource
Measuring actual discretion of the European Commission
Ambiguity and interpretive politics in the crisis of European values
Experimentalist but not Accountable Governance? The Role of Frontex in Managing the EU's External Borders
Hard Questions, Hard Solutions
Drivers of Consensus
The development of Frontex
More control–less agency slack? Principal control and the risk of agency slack in international organizations
Central banking and inequalities
Gradual Change in International Organisations
Together or Not? Dynamics of Public Attitudes on UN and Nato
The Lamfalussy Reform in the EU Securities Markets
Predicting Public Sector Accountability
European Union agencies and their management boards
European agencies as agents of governance and EU learning
Delegation and stewardship in international organizations
Principals, agents, and the implementation of EU cohesion policy
EU sectoral integration in the Eastern Neighbourhood
Keynote Article
Accountable and Under Control? Explaining Governments' Selection of Management Board Representatives
The Centralization of EU Competition Policy
International Courts and Public Opinion
Of Principal(s') Interest? A Disaggregated, Multiple Principals' Approach to Commission Discretion
EU Delegation and Agency in International Trade Negotiations
Principal–Agent Analysis and Pathological Delegation
Accountability in Accounting? The Politics of Private Rule-Making in the Public Interest
The New Governance of Markets and Non-Majoritarian Regulators
Q&A in legislative oversight
Congress, keystone of the Washington establishment
Institutions and Social Conflict
Moral Hazard and Observability
Structure and Process, Politics and Policy
The logic of delegation
Member States and International Institutions
Trapped in the supranational-intergovernmental dichotomy
The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets
Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission
The rise of the regulatory state in Europe
Calling the Tune Without Paying the Piper? Social policy regulation
Sterile Debates and Dubious Generalisations
Regulatory strategies, delegation and European market integration
Member states and the European Commission
Membership Matters
Preferences and Power in the European Community
The Institutional Foundations of Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism in the European Union
The politics of legal integration in the European Union
Delegation, agency, and agenda setting in the European Community
International cooperation and institutional choice
The Path to European Integration
Theory and Practice of Delegation to Non-Majoritarian Institutions
Comitology
Delegation and constraints in the national execution of the EC policies
An Assessment of the Positive Theory of 'Congressional Dominance
Regulating migration
European Integration from the 1980s
Is the ‘Hard Bargaining’ Image of the Council Misleading? The Committee of Permanent Representatives and the Local Elections Directive
The End of Creeping Competence? EU Policy‐Making Since Maastricht
Europe Before the Court
Introduction
Congressional Oversight Overlooked
The New Economics of Organization
An Ever Closer Fusion? A Dynamic Macropolitical View on Integration Processes
Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms
| Unique citing works | 104 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 4,52 |
| Citation span | 2003 - 2026 (24) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | Yes |
| Citation types | Neutral: 102 |