Q&A in legislative oversight
A framework for analysis
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 6256643 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Adina Maricut-Akbik (0000-0002-8183-5055, Hertie School Germany, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2021 |
| Volumen | 60 |
| Número | 3 |
| Páginas | 539-559 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2021-08-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | European Journal of Political Research (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0304-4130 • E-ISSN: 1475-6765 |
| Editorial | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/1475-6765.12411 |
| OpenAlex | W3045888437 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 16 |
| Referencias citadas | 43 |
Parliamentary questions are an essential tool of legislative oversight. However, the extent to which they are effective in controlling the executive remains underspecified both theoretically and methodologically. This article advances a systematic framework for evaluating the effectiveness of parliamentary questions drawing on principal–agent theory, the public administration literature on accountability and communication research. The framework is called the ‘Q&A approach to legislative oversight’ based on the premise that the study of parliamentary questions (Q) needs to be linked to their respective answers (A) and examined together (Q&A) at the micro‐level as an exchange of claims between legislative and executive actors. Methodologically, the Q&A approach to legislative oversight offers a step‐by‐step guide for qualitative content analysis of Q&A that can be applied to different legislative oversight contexts at different levels of governance. It is argued that the effectiveness of Q&A depends on the strength of the questions asked and the responsiveness of answers provided, which are correspondingly operationalised. To illustrate the merits of the approach, the article includes a systematic case study on the relationship between the European Parliament and the European Central Bank in banking supervision (2013–2018), showing the connection between specific institutional settings and the effectiveness of parliamentary questions
Accountability · Corporate governance · Economics · Epistemology · Law and economics · Legislature · Management · Parliament · Political science · Politics · Premise · Public economics · Public relations · Sociology · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Political Systems and Governance · Public Administration · Public Policy and Administration Research · Accounting
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| Obras citantes distintas | 16 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 4 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2022 - 2026 (5) |
| Velocidad de citación | current |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 16 |