A Hobbesian Defense of International Criminal Law
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12821936 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Larry May (Vanderbilt University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2014 |
| Volume | 14 |
| Issue | 4-5 |
| Pages | 768-788 |
| Publication date | 2014-07-31 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International Criminal Law Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1567-536X • E-ISSN: 1571-8123 |
| Publisher | Brill (PUBLISHER • NL) |
| DOI | 10.1163/15718123-01405003 |
| OpenAlex | W1989117897 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 3 |
I argue that when a Hobbesian State sovereign is not protecting, or is actively oppressing, his subjects, this opens the door for the possibility that another State or international institution could intervene to protect these people who are not having their security protected. Pursuing peace often means forming alliances and agreements that will lead to the establishment of a society that creates laws that are obeyed. Hobbes is quite explicit in allowing for just this possibility, and given that this is true, as I show, one wonders why Hobbes has been misunderstood for so long. The uncharitable explanation is that some theorists have seized on one quotation, which I examine in detail, and largely taken it out of context
Context (archaeology · Criminal law · Geography · Institution · International law · Law and economics · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Sovereign state · Sovereignty · State (computer science · Law · Seventeenth-Century Political and Philosophical Thought · War, Ethics, and Justification
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |