Compliance to “Unpleasant” actions of crisis management

Some remarks from a management control perspective

Bibliographic Data

ID12846980
AuthorsFriederike Wall (0000-0001-8001-8558, University of Klagenfurt, corresponding author)
Year2020
Volume20
Issue1
Pages159-164
Publication date2020-08-06
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueMind & Society (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1593-7879 • E-ISSN: 1860-1839
PublisherSpringer Science+Business Media (PUBLISHER • DE)
DOI10.1007/s11299-020-00250-4
OpenAlexW3047219111
LanguageEN
References cited12

In managing the Covid-16 pandemic, policy makers took actions which require the cooperation of individual citizens to succeed while the actions partially come at remarkable costs for individuals. The brief paper employs a thought experiment to identify factors which affect individuals’ propensity to cooperate in the public goods game. These factors reasonably comprise, for example, risk perception and attitude towards risk, embeddedness in a social network or the desire for social approval and may differ remarkably among the individuals of a collective. The paper adopts a management control perspective which appears to be particularly helpful to identify how to implement policy makers’ actions with respect to the diverse individuals in a collective. In order to predict the overall outcome of “unpleasant” actions, an approach is required which allows to capture the heterogeneity of individuals within a collective which makes agent-based modelling a promising candidate

Affect (linguistics · Business · Compliance (psychology · Control (management · Economics · Embeddedness · Microeconomics · Order (exchange · Perception · Perspective (graphical · Political science · Public economics · Public good · Public relations · Sociology · Complex Systems and Decision Making · Computer Science · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Psychology · Social Psychology

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