Political self-deception and epistemic vice
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12866709 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Neil C Manson (0000-0002-8663-6784, Lancaster University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 13 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 6-15 |
| Publication date | 2020-12-04 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Ethics & Global Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1654-6369 • E-ISSN: 1654-4951 |
| Publisher | Taylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/16544951.2020.1853921 |
| OpenAlex | W3110966782 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 6 |
Galeotti argues that we can gain a better understanding of political decision making by drawing upon the notion of self-deception and offers a rich articulation of what self-deception is, and how and why it exerts influence upon political decision making, especially in high-stakes contexts where the decision seems to be counter to rationality. But such contexts are also explicable from a different perspective, with different theoretical resources. In recent years the field of ‘virtue epistemology’ has discussed a wide range of epistemic vices – traits of character, and cognitive strategies, that stand in the way of gaining knowledge. This raises questions about how an explanation of political decision making in terms of self-deception relates to an explanation in terms of epistemic vice. Because the notion of epistemic vice applies to self-deception and to other cognitive deficiencies, it is argued that the broader notion of epistemic vice might be explanatorily richer, and more useful
Articulation (sociology · Cognition · Deception · Epistemic virtue · Epistemology · Perspective (graphical · Political science · Politics · Rationality · Self-deception · Sociology · Virtue · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies · Law · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology · Social Psychology · Artificial Intelligence
| Citations per year | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2026 - 2026 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |