Different Chocolate Directives

How does the setting influence negotiation outcomes in an eu simulation

Datos Bibliográficos

ID12869689
AutoresSimon Fink (0000-0002-3730-5137, University of Bamberg, autor de correspondencia)
Año2015
Volumen14
Número3
Páginas241-253
Fecha de publicación2015-05-08
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaEuropean Political Science (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 1680-4333 • E-ISSN: 1682-0983
EditorialPalgrave Macmillan (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1057/eps.2015.21
OpenAlexW1649073077
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas6
Referencias citadas23

The article analyses how the setting of EU simulations influences negotiation outcomes, that is, the content of the simulated directives. We have played the same simulation of the chocolate directive – the same roles and the same Commission proposal – in various settings (with different kinds of participants, various group sizes, for one or two days, with instructors or participants playing the European Parliament (EP)). A quantitative analysis elucidates relations between settings and outcomes we would not see when considering only one simulation at a time. First, the simulation scales well. Simulation duration, number and kind of participants have little impact on the range of outcomes. Second, the directive is more liberal if participants play the EP, indicating that our instructors play the EP too tough. Third, Swiss participants negotiate stricter and more consensual directives. These results can inform the further evolution of the simulation based on hard data

Business · Commission · Comparative politics · Directive · Duration (music · European commission · European union · International trade · Negotiation · Parliament · Political science · Politics · Computer Science · Innovative Teaching Methodologies in Social Sciences · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Political Science Research and Education · Psychology · Social Psychology