I that is We and We that is I
A Defense of Methodological Holism and the Primacy of Collective Agency
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12874337 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Denis Maslov (0000-0003-2806-5933, Institute of Philosophy, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 23 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 40-59 |
| Publication date | 2024-01-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Sotsiologicheskoe Obozrenie / Russian Sociological Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1728-192X • E-ISSN: 1728-1938 |
| Publisher | National Research University, Higher School of Economics (HSE) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.17323/1728-192x-2024-1-40-59 |
| OpenAlex | W4396661176 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 16 |
In a Hegelian spirit, this paper advances a methodological holism based on the ontological primacy of collective agency. The first section sketches the general problematic of methodological and ontological individualism and shows critical points. Two core components are discerned: an atom-like view of individuals as separate and independent from society and a mechanistic pattern of explanation that reduces institutions to interactions of singular individuals. In the second section, I argue in favor of methodological holism by showing that singular individuals are the product of the community in which they are raised. The section demonstrates methodological primacy of the whole through its ‘normative’ causality on individuals’ existence, identity, attitudes and actions. Singular individuals and their actions are rendered possible within and through the whole, taken as a set of institutions and structures. The third part presents a short account of a general individual (We-agent) that is causally effective in a normative and rational way. General individuals have intentionality, mind, personality, interests, etc. of their own that manifest in actions, thoughts and attitudes of singular individuals. General individuals differ from singular individuals by the scope of their interests and goals. General individuals possess intrinsic rationality and normativity that shows a pattern of valid explanation in the manner of methodological holism
Agency (philosophy · Epistemology · Holism · Sociology · Critical Realism in Sociology · Critical Theory and Philosophy · Philosophy · Psychology
What is a (social) structural explanation?
In Defense of Explanatory Ecumenism
Rejecting Retributivism
Elements of the Philosophy of ‘Right’
Methodological Individualism and Sociological Reductionism
The Logic of Collective Action
The Oxford Handbook of Analytical Sociology
Hegel's universal in Marx, Durkheim and Weber
Joint Actions and Group Agents
Ontological individualism reconsidered
Rescuing Ontological Individualism
Individualism and Global Supervenience
Failures of Methodological Individualism
Hegel contra sociology
Convention
Social Ontology
| Highly cited | No |
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