Making Social Worlds

Bibliographic Data

ID12955282
AuthorsAndrius Gališanka (0000-0001-9582-814X, University of California, Berkeley, corresponding author)
Year2012
Volume6
Issue1
Pages115-133
Publication date2012-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of the Philosophy of History (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1872-261X • E-ISSN: 1872-2636
PublisherBrill (PUBLISHER • NL)
DOI10.1163/187226312x625636
OpenAlexW2024958958
LanguageEN
References cited8

Making the Social World is John Searle’s latest statement on social ontology. His argument is clarified and expanded, but, despite various objections, it remains largely unchanged. In this review, I want to present Searle’s new book in light of these objections, explain why he has rejected the more important among them, and ask whether his reasons for doing so are defensible. I first present arguments that Searle’s naturalism – his broader philosophical project – does not have a definite shape in the social realm. I argue that this view is largely right because Searle allows for two seemingly inconsistent approaches: historical narratives and generalized explanations. I then introduce objections from historicists, who argue that Searle’s theory is not in fact compatible with historical explanations. I explain why Searle rejects these objections, and suggest that his reasons for doing so cannot be defended against examples of conceptual incongruity. On the whole, I argue that Searle’s naturalism starts from stronger assumptions than argument allows

Argument (complex analysis · Epistemology · Narrative · Naturalism · Ontology · Realm · Reflexive pronoun · Social ontology · Sociology · Statement (logic · Contemporary Sociological Theory and Practice · Critical Realism in Sociology · Law · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science

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