Why the U.S. Government Failed to Anticipate the Rwandan Genocide of 1994

Lessons for Early Warning and Prevention

Bibliographic Data

ID12967249
AuthorsMatthew Levinger (George Washington University, corresponding author)
Year2016
Volume9
Issue3
Pages33-58
Publication date2016-02-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueGenocide Studies and Prevention (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1911-0359 • E-ISSN: 1911-9933
PublisherInternational Association of Genocide Scholars (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.5038/1911-9933.9.3.1362
OpenAlexW2286995455
LanguageEN
Citations received6
References cited13

During the months leading up to the Rwandan genocide of 1994, cognitive biases obstructed the capacity of U.S. government analysts and policymakers to anticipate mass violence against the country’s Tutsi minority. Drawing on recently declassified U.S. government documents and on interviews with key current and former officials, this essay shows that most U.S. government reporting on Rwanda before April 1994 utilized a faulty cognitive frame that failed to differentiate between threats of civil war and genocide. Because U.S. officials framed the crisis in Rwanda as a potential civil war, they underestimated the virulence of the threat to Tutsi civilians and discounted the risk of catastrophic violence. The “civil war frame” also justified rigid U.S. policy guidance that may have exacerbated ethnic and political conflicts in Rwanda on the eve of the genocide. The phenomenon of faulty cognitive framing remains a challenge for contemporary atrocity prevention and response efforts in countries including Libya, South Sudan, and Syria

Civil society · Criminology · Development economics · Economics · Framing (construction · Genocide · Government (linguistics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Spanish Civil War · Global Peace and Security Dynamics · History · Law · Middle East and Rwanda Conflicts · Political Conflict and Governance

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