Military Innovation and Technological Determinism
British and US Ways of Carrier Warfare, 1919–1945
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 13020428 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Kendrick Kuo (0000-0001-9053-0483, George Washington University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 6 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Publication date | 2020-09-18 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Global Security Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 2057-3189 • E-ISSN: 2057-3189 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/jogss/ogaa046 |
| OpenAlex | W3091854692 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 65 |
Major theories of military innovation suggest that military organizations will converge on the proper employment of new weapons if they are responsive to strategic threats and overcome cultural, bureaucratic, and material constraints. Using a comparison of British and US interwar carrier programs, I show how these standard intuitions about military innovation wrongly assume that there is a predetermined performance trajectory embedded in new technology. The Royal Navy employed carrier technology differently from its American counterpart, not because of cultural biases, bureaucratic parochialism, or resource scarcity, but because the British possessed in-theater military bases and faced the threat of land-based enemy aircraft in the North Sea, the Mediterranean, and the Far East. British carrier warfare, which the field of military innovation studies roundly criticizes as non-innovative and ineffective, was in fact a creative solution for Britain's geostrategic challenges that proved effective for the first couple of years of World War II. Since carrier warfare is a canonical case for military innovation studies, revising our understanding of Britain's interwar carrier program has significant implications for the way scholars conceptualize military innovation and its relationship to wartime military performance
Adversary · Bureaucracy · Computer security · Military science · Military technology · Mobilities · Modern warfare · Navy · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Revolution in Military Affairs · Social science · Sociology · Technological determinism · Defense, Military, and Policy Studies · Engineering · International Business and FDI · Law
Power in Uncertain Times
The baroque arsenal
Innovation and the arms race
Royal Navy Strategy in the Far East 1919-1939
Sea Control in Narrow Waters
How Users Matter
The Diffusion of Military Power
Imagining War
War-Winning Weapons
The Historiography of Airpower
Defending the Indefensible? The Air Defence of Malta, 1936-1940
Royal Navy Fleet Tactics on the Eve of the Second World War
Managing Military Transformations
The Best Laid Plans’
Nationalism and Religion in Vietnam
The Social Construction of Facts and Artefacts
New Ways of War
Innovation Inhibitors in War
Strategy, Fleet Logistics, and the Lethbridge Mission to the Pacific and Indian Oceans 1943–1944
The future of military innovation studies
Military Maladaptation
The interwar army and mechanization
How are we going to make war?’
The strategic interface
The Influence of History on Sea Power
Whole World on Fire
Winning the Next War
The Naval War in the Mediterranean
British seapower and procurement between the wars
The Gunpowder Age
Theory of international politics
The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas
Military Innovation's Dialectic
We Cannot Go On
The Diffusion of Drone Warfare? Industrial, Organizational, and Infrastructural Constraints
Systemic effects of military innovation and diffusion
World War II at Sea
Technology, Traditionalism, and Military Establishments
War upon the Map
Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0.75 |
| Citation span | 2022 - 2024 (3) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |