Social norms of corruption in the field
Social nudges on posters can help to reduce bribery
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 13109331 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Nils Köbis (0000-0002-0608-7333, University of Amsterdam, corresponding author), Marleen Troost (University of Amsterdam), Cyril Brandt (0000-0003-4346-0210, University of Antwerp), Ivan Soraperra (0000-0002-4596-3885, University of Amsterdam) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 6 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 597-624 |
| Publication date | 2019-12-20 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Behavioural Public Policy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 2398-063X • E-ISSN: 2398-0648 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/bpp.2019.37 |
| OpenAlex | W2996570391 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 41 |
| References cited | 57 |
Corruption in the form of bribery continues to be a major societal challenge around the world. The current lab-in-the-field study tested whether dynamic descriptive norms messages on posters can help to reduce bribery. Before, during and after placing posters throughout a medium-sized South African town, incentivized measures of social norms and bribery were assessed in a mobile lab. A total of 311 participants stemming from the general population took part. In line with the pre-registered predictions, the results reveal that people: (1) perceive bribery to be less common; and (b) engage in bribery in a corruption game less frequently when the posters were displayed. The discussion outlines how social norms nudging campaigns can be leveraged to spur collective action against corruption
Action (physics · Collective action · Field (mathematics · Language change · Nudge theory · Political science · Politics · Population · Public relations · Sociology · Corruption and Economic Development · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law · Misinformation and Its Impacts · Psychology · Social Psychology
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| Unique citing works | 41 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 8,2 |
| Citation span | 2021 - 2026 (6) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 40 |