Whistleblowing and tax evasion
Experimental evidence
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 13119259 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Michele Bernasconi (0000-0003-2386-666X, Ca' Foscari University of Venice, corresponding author), Luca Corazzini (0000-0002-0567-8457, Ca' Foscari University of Venice), Tiziana Medda (Ca' Foscari University of Venice) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 11 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 316-333 |
| Publication date | 2022-11-08 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Economic and Political Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 2470-4024 • E-ISSN: 2095-4816 |
| Publisher | Taylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/20954816.2022.2130065 |
| OpenAlex | W4308568596 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 25 |
In a tax compliance experiment we manipulate various dimensions to isolate the effects of whistleblowing: whether incomes are homogeneous or heterogeneous; whether whistleblowing is permitted or not; and whether subjects have complete or incomplete information about others’ tax evasion. Under complete information, we find that whistleblowing has a strong impact on compliance, reducing the proportion of concealed income and increasing the precision of the auditing procedure. Moreover, the probability of being whistled increases with evasion and rich subjects react to whistleblowing more than poor subjects do. Introducing incomplete information reduces the deterrent effect of whistleblowing, but not among the richest taxpayers
Audit · Business · Complete information · Compliance (psychology · Economics · Evasion (ethics · Homogeneous · Microeconomics · Public economics · Tax Evasion · Corruption and Economic Development · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Mathematics · Medicine · Psychology · Social Psychology · Taxation and Compliance Studies · Accounting · Immunology
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| Citations per year | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2025 - 2025 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |