Better to Return Whence We Came
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 13598299 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Ema Sullivan-Bissett (0000-0002-6327-7424, University of Birmingham, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 56 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 85-100 |
| Publication date | 2022-03-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Journal of Value Inquiry (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-5363 • E-ISSN: 1573-0492 |
| Publisher | Springer Science+Business Media (PUBLISHER • DE) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s10790-022-09888-4 |
| OpenAlex | W4214808557 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 1 |
I argue that David Benatar's anti-natalism leads to pro-mortalism (the view that it is better to cease to exist) because the human predicament as he describes it is a fate worse than death. Thus, continued existence in such a predicament is not preferable to an exit from it. I revisit my earlier argument for the claim that Benatar's (2006) asymmetry between pleasure and pain paved the way for pro-mortalism unless Epicureanism about death is ruled out. I reply to Benatar's response to that argument. I then turn to Benatar's (2017) characterization of the human predicament and suggest that that also leads to pro-mortalism. I respond to three arguments from Benatar that seek to block the move from our predicament to pro-mortalism. I conclude that if Benatar is right about the predicament we find ourselves in, it is better for most people to return whence they came
Death Anxiety and Social Exclusion · History · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Theology and Philosophy of Evil
| Citations per year | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2026 - 2026 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |