Why Death Is Most in One's Self‐Interest, and Necessarily So

Bibliographic Data

ID21504174
AuthorsVictor Kriska (0009-0000-9920-7535, Department of Philosophy Bowling Green State University Bowling Green Ohio USA, corresponding author)
Year2026
Volume40
Issue5
Pages499-504
Publication date2026-06-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueBioethics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0269-9702 • E-ISSN: 1467-8519
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/bioe.70059
PMID41450181
OpenAlexW7117306795
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited17

Most of us think that death is usually not in the self‐interest of the one who dies. Let us momentarily put this belief aside and examine death in a new light. This paper presents a two‐step argument to show why death is most in one's self‐interest, necessarily. The first step contends that death minimizes one's bad at no loss of one's good, such that if one's life has or will have any bad whatsoever, death is most in one's self‐interest. The second step maintains that all possible self‐interested lives have extrinsic bad given their potential to be better. Hence, death is most in one's self‐interest, necessarily. This paper challenges prevailing notions on death and remains fruitful even for those readers disinclined to accept its conclusion. Attempting to determine where the argument goes awry provides an opportunity to sharpen one's own views on death

Afterlife · Aside · Good death · Natural death · Value of life · Death Anxiety and Social Exclusion · Organ Donation and Transplantation · Philosophical Ethics and Theory

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