Is There an Allais Paradox? A Note on its Resolution
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 13670560 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Michael Emmett Brady (0000-0003-1006-6874, California State University, Long Beach, corresponding author), Howard B Lee (California State University, Long Beach) |
| Year | 1989 |
| Volume | 64 |
| Issue | 3_suppl |
| Pages | 1223-1230 |
| Publication date | 1989-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Psychological Reports (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0033-2941 • E-ISSN: 1558-691X |
| Publisher | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.2466/pr0.1989.64.3c.1223 |
| OpenAlex | W2076452826 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 5 |
If a decision maker uses J. M. Keynes' “conventional coefficient of risk and weight” in making decisions under conditions of risk and/or uncertainty, then a consistent pattern of ranked outcome results is not paradoxical as proposed by Allais. Similarly, the paradoxical aspects of the “reflection effect” in Kahneman and Tversky's Prospect Theory analysis of the Allais' paradox, also vanishes. The Allais Paradox can only exist when probabilities are used in a decision-making process without a measure of confidence. By incorporating an information base for calculated probabilities the Allais Paradox results are rendered nonparadoxical
Decision theory · Economics · Expected utility hypothesis · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Prospect theory · Statistics · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Mathematics · Psychology
A Note on the Extension of J. M. Keynes' Decision Theory
J. M. Keynes' Decision Theory, a Technical Note
Theoretical Comparison of the Decision Theories of J. M. Keynes, Kahneman-Tversky, and Einhorn-Hogarth
J. M. Keynes's Theoretical Approach to Decision-making Under Conditions of Risk and Uncertainty
| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,11 |
| Citation span | 1991 - 1994 (4) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 4 |