Reciprocity, Cohesiveness and Cooperation in Two-Person Games
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 13670609 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Sanford L Braver (Arizona State University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1975 |
| Volume | 36 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 371-378 |
| Publication date | 1975-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Psychological Reports (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0033-2941 • E-ISSN: 1558-691X |
| Publisher | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.2466/pr0.1975.36.2.371 |
| OpenAlex | W2044567560 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 25 |
After manipulation of dyad cohesiveness, subjects played a differential power game from the position of low power. Their simulated opponent of high power accorded them benefits (reward) on 0%, 50%, or 100% of the trials. Subsequently the roles were reversed so that the subject had the high power and the opportunity to reward his opponent. Finally, the subjects played a one-trial Prisoner's Dilemma game. The results for the power game indicated that the amount of reward the subject gave to his opponent depended upon both the opponent's earlier level of reward and cohesiveness. However, only the cohesiveness manipulation influenced the Prisoner's Dilemma game, with unusually high cooperation resulting over-all. Additional analyses showed that: (a) reciprocation—either reciprocal giving or reciprocal withholding of reward—in the power game promoted cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma; and (b) cohesiveness affected the Prisoner's Dilemma game responses of only those subjects uncertain of which response to expect from their opponent
Adversary · Dilemma · Dyad · Economics · Group cohesiveness · Microeconomics · Power (physics · Prisoner's dilemma · Reciprocal · Reciprocity (cultural anthropology · Statistics · Stochastic game · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Mathematics · Psychology · Social Psychology
Group dynamics
Prior dyadic experience and monetary reward as determinants of cooperative and competitive game behavior
Group Standards, Cohesiveness, and Productivity
An Experimental Study of Cohesiveness and Productivity
Communication, the Development of Trust, and Cooperative Behavior
Structural and attitudinal factors in interpersonal bargaining
Effect of asymmetry in payoff on behavior in a two-person non-zero-sum game
Factors affecting cooperation in a Prisoner's Dilemma game
Effects of prior interaction, contact, strategy, and expectation of meeting on game behavior and sentiment
Effects of friendship and disliking on cooperation in a mixed-motive game1
Effects of the partner's abrupt strategy change upon subject's responding in the Prisoner's Dilemma
Effects of the emotional relationship between protagonists in the prisoner's dilemma
Effects of prior exposure to cooperative or competitive treatment upon subject's responding in the Prisoner's Dilemma
Previous experience within the dyad and cooperative game behavior
Reciprocity and credit building in a laboratory dyad
Effects of the emotional relationship between protagonists in a two-person game
Trust and suspicion
Social Pressures in Informal Groups
Influence through social communication
The Norm of Reciprocity
| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,09 |
| Citation span | 1980 - 2014 (35) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 4 |