A Competition Perspective on Physician Non-compete Agreements
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 13776402 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Daniel J Gilman (0000-0001-5896-5815, International Center for Law & Economics, Portland, OR, USA, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 61 |
| Pages | 469580241237621-469580241237621 |
| Publication date | 2024-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | INQUIRY The Journal of Health Care Organization Provision and Financing (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0046-9580 • E-ISSN: 1945-7243 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/00469580241237621 |
| PMID | 38462909 |
| OpenAlex | W4392665503 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 23 |
Physician non-compete agreements may have significant competitive implications, and effects on both providers and patients, but they are treated variously under the law on a state-by-state basis. Reviewing the relevant law and the economic literature cannot identify with confidence the net effects of such agreements on either physicians or health care delivery with any generality. In addition to identifying future research projects to inform policy, it is argued that the antitrust "rule of reason" provides a useful and established framework with which to evaluate such agreements in specific health care markets and, potentially, to address those agreements most likely to do significant damage to health care competition and consumers
Actuarial science · Business · Competition (biology · Competition law · Economic growth · Economics · Generality · Health care · Industrial organization · Law and economics · Management · Microeconomics · Perspective (graphical · Political science · Public economics · Rule of reason · State (computer science · Supreme court · Healthcare Policy and Management · Law · Merger and Competition Analysis · Pharmaceutical industry and healthcare
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |